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1 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
2 Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules, 3 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 290 (2001).
3 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
4 See U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—NATURE OF SUIT OR OFFENSE IN CASES ARISING
FROM THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, BY CIRCUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING
SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, tbl.B-7, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/B07Sep07
.pdf (documenting rates and classes of appeals); Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the
Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766,
771 (1983) (concluding that “[t]he swelling influx of cases in large part reflects more legal
protections, benefits, and access for those groups that previously only encountered the law
as a weapon aimed against them”). For an example of these types of cases, see also Mike
Gangloff, The Invisible Docket, THE ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Apr. 27, 2008, at 1, 6
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A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, some-
body loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.1
Judge Arnold’s opinion in Anastasoff is remarkable for its portrayal
of our judicial system as guilty of the same kinds of ill-conceived
miscalculations that the courts daily unveil in the context of admin-
istrative agencies and large corporations.2
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and effi-
ciency.  Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general,
and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed
to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the over-
bearing concerns for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.3
INTRODUCTION
In the post-Brown era, many Americans have come to believe that the federal
courts, and the judges who embody them, are their best protectors against govern-
ment overreaching or unfair or unequal treatment at the hands of the state.4  It was not
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(documenting the large increase in prison condition lawsuits brought by inmates, especially
in the Western District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit).
5 The plaque, located on one of the Liberty Bell Center’s exhibit panels, reads as follows:
“The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 strengthened the federal government’s commitment to the
survival of slavery. It required federal officials to capture and return runaway slaves, and
obligated all citizens to cooperate. The United States District Court administered the 1850
Act on the second floor of Independence Hall, above the museum in which the Liberty Bell
was enshrined.”
6 I am using Marc Galanter’s terminology here. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95
(1974); see also William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the
New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 277,
292 (1996) [hereinafter Richman & Reynolds, Elitism] (noting that “those without power re-
ceive less (and different) justice,” and registering that “the effect of staff participation is felt
most keenly in cases brought by the poor—the group most in need of the services of the federal
judiciary”); Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 32, 49 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Citation] (“Large
institutional litigants—and the big firms that represent them—disproportionately receive careful
attention to their briefs, an oral argument, and a published decision written by a judge. Others—
including the poor and the middle class, prisoners, and pro se litigants—disproportionately
receive a quick skim of their briefs, no oral argument, and an unpublished decision copied out
of a bench memo by a clerk.”). In addition to the evidence of disproportionately poor outcome
for “have-not” litigants whose appeals are effectively adjudicated by court staff, see infra
notes 55–56 and accompanying text, institutionalized unpublication enables “haves” to “stack
the precedential deck” in their favor. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion:
Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87
MICH. L. REV. 940, 958 (1989) [hereinafter Robel, Myth of the Disposable Opinion].
7 For a posthumous tribute to Judge Richard S. Arnold, see Frank I. Michelman,
Anastasoff and Remembrance, 58 ARK. L. REV. 555 (2005).
8 John Borger and Chad Oldfather called the decision an “explosive charge.” John P.
Borger & Chad M. Oldfather, Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate over Unpublished
Opinions, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 899, 899 (2001).
always this way.  A small plaque in the National Parks’ Service Liberty Bell exhibit
in Philadelphia tells an older, different, and abiding story:  at one time in the bell’s
peripatetic history, it was housed in the same building as the federal district court
that enforced the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.5
What should the federal courts of appeals do when confronted with assertions
from among their ranks that their own judging practices are themselves unconstitu-
tional?  Practices such as enacting rules that would strike many common-law lawyers
as bizarre, ostensibly for rational reasons, when there is evidence that they function
and are in part designed to give cover to shoddy practices, including denying similarly
situated litigants equal treatment; systematically structurally subordinating “have-
nots;”6 and delegating most of their workload to often under-supervised staff whose
competence the judges mistrust?  Although this Article goes on to propose one answer,
another deserves mention:  in 2001, a respected intellectual leader of the federal appel-
late bench7 threw a bomb8 into the way the federal courts have come to exercise
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9 See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1436–37, 1471–72, 1567–79 [hereinafter Pether,
Inequitable Injunctions]. This practice has spread to federal district and state courts. See id.
at 1472–73, 1536–67.
10 1ST CIR. R. 32.1.0(a); 2D CIR. R. 32.1(a)(b); 3D CIR. R. 5; 4TH CIR. R. 32.1; 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.3–4; 6TH CIR. R. 206(c); 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(a)(b); 8TH. CIR. R. 32.1A; 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a);
10TH CIR. R. 32.1; 11TH. CIR. R. 36-2, 36-3; D.C. CIR. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B), 36(c)(2); FED. CIR. R.
32.1(d); D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures § I.XII.A, at 52 (2007).
11 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated en banc as moot,
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
12 See, e.g., Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1442–74; Amy E. Sloan, A
Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions by Statute or
Procedural Rule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 717–19 (2004) [hereinafter Sloan, Government of Laws].
13 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
14 Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of Appeals,
29 VT. L. REV. 555 (2005) (making a Due Process Clause argument on the constitutionality
of unpublished opinions); David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the Judicially
Unsound Unpublication System, 92 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Cleveland,
Draining the Morass] (advocating Supreme Court adjudication of the constitutionality of
nonprecedential status rules, advancing equal protection and due process arguments against
the rules’ constitutionality, and briefly summarizing litigant arguments on the constitutionality
issue in prior petitions for certiorari); David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The
Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
(forthcoming 2009) (briefly describing earlier arguments for the unconstitutionality of non-
precedential status rules); David Greenwald & Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial
Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1133 (2002) (making a First Amendment argument on the
constitutionality of unpublished opinions); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional
Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 (2001) (arguing on historical grounds that stare decisis
is not constitutionally mandated); Daniel N. Hoffman, Publicity and the Judicial Power, 3 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 343 (2001) (arguing on policy grounds that authorizing courts not to
Article III office since the late 1950s.9  The Eighth Circuit’s Judge Richard S. Arnold,
since deceased, held that an aspect of the local rules of that circuit, reflected in the
rules of each circuit,10 was unconstitutional because ultra vires Article III power.11
The constitutional infirmity lay in the part of the ubiquitous local “unpublished
opinion” rules—developed since the early 1960s12 as an incident of institutionalizing
“unpublication” of judicial opinions—decreeing that unpublished opinions are not
precedent (hereinafter “nonprecedential status rules”).
Given the nature and scope of his holding in Anastasoff v. United States, which
had the capacity to undermine the legitimacy of most federal appellate judging and to
require a paradigm shift in the way the circuit courts operate, Judge Arnold’s meta-
phorical bomb caused a relatively modest explosion.  While a member of the Ninth
Circuit shortly thereafter found the opportunity to author an opinion holding that the
Ninth Circuit’s nonprecedential status rule was constitutional,13 what is remarkable
is how small the reaction has been.
There was a modest flurry of scholarship on the constitutionality of various
aspects of local rules providing for unpublished opinions,14 much of it in the student
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follow precedent, delivering unreasoned judgments, and using inherently political rather than
legal methods of decision making are ultra vires Article III); Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 2;
Amy E. Sloan, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential
Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895 (2008) [hereinafter Sloan,
Pragmatic Approach]; Sloan, Government of Laws, supra note 12; Melissa H. Weresh, The
Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 175, 193–96 (2001) (briefly asserting that nonprecedential status rules violate due
process because they deny “reasoned explanation” and entail “arbitrary adjudication,” and
because stare decisis may be “fundamental to the scheme of ordered liberty,” they violate equal
protection because they disadvantage the poor and treat similarly situated litigants differently);
see also Schiltz, Citation, supra note 6, at 32, 50–51 (noting that the Advisory Committee
on Appellate Rules at one point “allude[d] to a potential First Amendment problem” with
citation bans and articulating the possible First Amendment problems with citation bans);
Bradley Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by Rule?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 645
(2006) (making a nonconstitutional case for the illegitimacy of nonprecedential status rules).
15 Charles R. Eloshway, Note, Say it Ain’t So: Non-Precedential Opinions Exceed the
Limits of Article III Powers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 633, 643 (2002) (arguing that non-
precedential status rules are ultra vires Article III power on originalist grounds, that U.S.
federal courts are common law courts, and, thus, cannot disregard precedent, and that the fetter-
ing of litigant argument based on precedent is “substantive” rather than “procedural”); Kenneth
Anthony Laretto, Note, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of “No-Citation”
Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2002) (making an
originalist argument for the constitutionality of precedent as an incident of Article III power
while arguing that “no-citation rules are . . . constitutionally justified as applied to decisions
that are objectively non-precedential”); Drew R. Quitschau, Note, Anastasoff v. United States:
Uncertainty in the Eighth Circuit—Is There a Constitutional Right to Cite Unpublished
Opinions?, 54 ARK. L. REV. 847, 848 (2002) (arguing that “Judge Arnold was correct and . . .
the no-citation rule is unconstitutional because: (1) it violates stare decisis; and (2) it abridges
free speech and denies meaningful court access”); Jon A. Strongman, Comment, Unpublished
Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Pre-
cedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 196, 219–20 (2001) (arguing
that “refusing to recognize unpublished opinions as precedent potentially violates both the
procedural due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment,” and the
“fundamental right . . . to a fair judicial process”).
16 William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the
Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 321 & n.54 (1985) (asserting that
nonprecedential status rules breach the separation of powers because “a common law court
that is not bound by its own decisions has, in some sense, ceased to act purely as a court and
may be exercising power that is decidedly nonjudicial,” and that “[a] court deciding cases
that lack precedential effect separates its dispute-settling function from its law-making function.
Thus, the court leaves behind a substantial part of its essential and inherent judicial functions”
(citation omitted)).
17 David Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 128 (1977).
18 Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the
note genre,15 after Judge Arnold’s decision in Anastasoff was handed down.  Earlier
scholarship has advanced various thinly articulated arguments—based variously on
separation of powers,16 due process,17 and First Amendment18 grounds—for the
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Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.
C. L. REV. 235, 248 (1998).
19 In re Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 955 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.
1992); Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972).
20 See supra note 10.
21 It is possible to categorize the different rules as more or less completely rendering
unpublished opinions nonprecedential. See Sloan, Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at
918–22.
22 For the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2006, in the twelve circuits that
report this data, 84.1% of cases terminated on the merits were determined in unpublished
opinions. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 52 (2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/completejudicialbusiness.pdf.
23 In the period 1990–2000, the percentage increased from 68.4% to 79.8%. Michael
Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 202–03 (2001).
24 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992)
(noting the importance of stare decisis, but acknowledging that, at times, prudential and
pragmatic considerations overrule strict adherence to the doctrine). I should register here that
there seems nothing problematic with the descriptive fact that different opinions will have
different precedential status, depending on the quality of the legal reasoning and whether the
issues addressed make it a leading case on a particular issue.
25 See, e.g., Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1504–07 (suggesting that dis-
advantaged groups are more likely to be adversely affected by institutionalized unpublication).
26 See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 6, at 280 (noting that appeals where
“briefing is pro se, bad, or non-existent” disproportionately end up on the screening track);
Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning
of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 402 (2002) (noting that pro
se appeals disproportionately terminate in unpublished opinions); Howard Slavitt, Selling the
Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109 (1995) [hereinafter Slavitt, Selling the Integrity] (noting that
alleged unconstitutionality of the rules and the judging practices that they justify and
enable.  Two earlier circuit court opinions had also cast doubt on the constitutionality
of nonprecedential status rules.19
Why is the modest reaction to Judge Arnold’s Anastasoff opinion remarkable?
First, every circuit20 has a rule that effectively21 renders unpublished opinions nonpre-
cedential ab initio.  Second, the percentage of federal appellate decisions that are un-
published presently runs at almost eighty-five percent,22 and that percentage is rising.23
That is, the vast majority of the opinions issued—which are the products of judging
done—in the federal courts are arguably the product of an unconstitutional practice.
Next, when they make these local rules, courts authorize themselves to decide an
issue one way, and then to refuse to decide the appeal of a similarly situated litigant the
same way—whether applying a rule or not applying it—without the characteristic rea-
sons for deciding to break from stare decisis.24  More troubling still, these opinions clus-
ter in certain kinds of cases,25 where those on the margins of the nation’s life—the poor,26
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appeals brought by the indigent are over-represented in those terminating in unpublished
opinions).
27 See, e.g., Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1445 (documenting the evi-
dence that institutionalized unpublication was developed in response to civil rights appeals,
as well as pro se prisoner conviction appeals); Penelope Pether, Take a Letter, Your Honor:
Outing the Judicial Epistemology of Hart v. Massanari, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1553, 1585
n.205 (2005) (recording correspondence from Professor Brian K. Landsberg revealing that
many important federal district court opinions on race relations were unpublished); Slavitt,
Selling the Integrity, supra note 26, at 110–12 (noting the impact of institutionalized unpub-
lication on members of minority groups).
28 See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 14, 20 & n.104 (2007) [hereinafter Pether,
Sorcerers] (concluding that asylum cases are often “singled out for decision making by clerks
and staff attorneys”).
29 See, e.g., Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1506 (discussing the evi-
dence that prison conditions litigation appeals are disproportionately screened into the track
that culminates in unpublished opinions).
30 See, e.g., id. at 1505 n.404 (citing evidence that opinions operate to disadvantage gays).
31 Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004, at 10 (quoting Judge
Alex Kozinski, who said that “[u]npublished dispositions—unlike opinions—are often drafted
entirely by law clerks and staff attorneys . . . . There is simply no time or opportunity to fine-
tune the language of the disposition . . . . When the people making the sausage tell you it’s
not safe for human consumption, it seems strange indeed to have a committee in Washington
tell people to go ahead and eat it anyway”).
32 William T. Hangley, Opinions Hidden, Citations Forbidden: A Report and Recom-
mendations of the American College of Trial Lawyers on the Publication and Citation of
Nonbinding Federal Circuit Court Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645, 651 (2002).
33 Mauro, supra note 31.
persons of color,27 immigrants,28 prisoners,29 members of sexual minority groups30—
appeal to the federal courts to do justice.  What really drives this marginalization of
the marginalized, however, is even more troubling.
Nonprecedential status rules exist because, to paraphrase the Ninth Circuit’s (now
Chief) Judge Alex Kozinski, unpublished opinions are “not safe for human consump-
tion,”31 because of the “[judicial] fear that they may say something that is wrong.”32
Judge Kozinski admitted that “[u]npublished dispositions—unlike opinions—are often
drafted entirely by law clerks and staff attorneys.”33  Later, writing to (then circuit
judge) Samuel Alito, he was even more blunt:
Any nuances in language [in unpublished opinions], any apparent
departures from published precedent, may or may not reflect the
view of the three judges on the panel—most likely not—but they
cannot conceivably be presented as the view of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.  To cite them as if they were—as if they repre-
sented more than the bare result as explicated by some law clerk
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34 Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Judge
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Comm. On Appellate Rules 7 (Jan. 16, 2004) [herein-
after Kozinski Letter] (on file with the author); see also Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About
Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1429, 1487–88 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Much Ado] (“Consider . . . the way
that the Ninth Circuit handles about 40% of its merits dispositions: A three-judge panel will
assemble to decide fifty or more cases in a single day. The judges will generally not read the
briefs, the records, or anything else in advance. Instead, they will rely entirely on an oral de-
scription of the case provided by a staff attorney. The staff attorney will describe how he or
she believes the case should be resolved and present an opinion that he or she has drafted. The
panel will glance at the opinion, give its consent, and move on to the next case. It is not un-
common for an appeal to be disposed of in this manner in as few as five minutes.”).
35 See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 6, at 286.
36 A point forcefully made by Richman & Reynolds, id., at 293–96. See also William L.
Reynolds & William M. Richman, The New Certiorari Courts, 80 JUDICATURE 206, 206–07
(1997); William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Federal Judgeships, 1
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 37, 38 (1999).
or staff attorney—is a particularly subtle and insidious form of
fraud.34
Thus, any complete analysis of the constitutional problems with nonprecedential
status rules must address more than nonprecedential status rules and their result, that
the issuing court is not bound to follow what it holds in unpublished opinions in like
cases, which is where the current scholarly focus on the constitutional status of non-
precedential status rules begins and ends.  It must also include the widespread de facto
delegation of Article III power to persons who are not Article III judges, and who pre-
sumptively lack both the qualifications that Article III office demands, and the in-
dependence that life tenure and constitutionalized salary protections give Article III
officeholders.  Independence is particularly significant in the U.S. constitutional con-
text:  the types of matters that are overwhelmingly clustered in the corpus of unpub-
lished opinions have the government as defendant.35
Finally, the material practices that led to the development of nonprecedential
status rules and are implicated in them mean that what are held out by the courts as
appeals as of right can amount, in fact, to no more than bad faith certiorari proce-
dures.36  Thus, an adequate constitutional analysis should address—as none of the
earlier jurisprudence or scholarship has—the fundamental right of access to the courts
doctrine that lies in the interstices of “fundamental interests” equal protection doc-
trine and procedural due process, and its intersection with what is within and what
is ultra vires Article III power.
In Part I, I document the history of the development of nonprecedential status
rules and the practices they justify and enable, the delegation of Article III power to
often inadequately supervised adjuncts, and the adjudicatory processes that arguably
deny genuine appeals to many federal appellants, enabling the substitution of an
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37 This doctrine is of a kind radically different from that advanced by James Liebman and
William Ryan. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
696 (1998).
38 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
39 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
40 Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924).
unsafe certiorari process.  I also outline the evidence that most federal appeals are
decided by inadequately supervised junior court staff, whose attitudes to “have-not”
litigants produce structurally subordinating effects.  I go on to document the case law
on the constitutionality of nonprecedential status rules.
Part II describes the jurisprudence and legal scholarship on the constitutionality
of nonprecedential status rules, beginning with a brief account of constitutional analy-
sis based on the First Amendment, and on due process and equal protection doctrine.
It continues by anatomizing three different bodies of work bearing on the question of
whether nonprecedential status rules and the practices they justify and enable are ultra
vires Article III:  originalist and other historical work; narrow scholarship dealing spe-
cifically with the constitutionality of nonprecedential status rules and citation bans;
and mainstream Article III inherent powers scholarship and contributions to debates
about the constitutionality of the doctrine of precedent.  It documents the narrow,
formalistic, and largely misdirected ultra vires Article III discussion that has taken
place thus far, much of which has centered on the citation bans prospectively abol-
ished by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 32.1, and the fruitless efforts
to find originalist evidence to authorize or negate the constitutionality of nonprece-
dential status rules.  Because prior scholarship has largely failed to inquire into the
relevance of work by leading constitutional law and federal courts scholars in deter-
mining whether Article III power is consistent with nonprecedential status rules, it
engages with Adrian Vermeule’s account of “freestanding” Article III power, and
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.’s work on the constitutionality of precedent, the latter of which
deals in passing with nonprecedential status rules in the lower Article III courts.
Part II concludes, first, by identifying what this body of work suggests is of relevance
to a plenary account of Article III power; second, by describing the inadequacies of
this prior scholarship for an adequate assessment of the constitutional status of non-
precedential status rules; and third, by exploring two potential doctrinal bases for
assessing the rules’ constitutionality, the branch of fundamental interests doctrine deal-
ing with the right of access to the courts, and adjudicatory non-delegation doctrine.
In Part III, I go on to propose a “thick” doctrine of Article III power,37 engaging
with three sources:  a critical reading of the leading separation of judicial power cases,
from Hayburn’s Case38 to Miller v. French;39 an analysis of whether the doctrine on
what Article III power is “essential to the administration of justice”40 determines the
constitutionality of nonprecedential status rules and the practices they justify and en-
able; and an account of the guidance to this constitutional inquiry that inconclusive
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41 My (contextually ironic) reference is to MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988), a seminal work on judicial
review of administrative action after the development of the U.S. administrative state.
42 While nonprecedential status rules also occur at the state appellate level and while the
material practices that make them constitutionally suspect also affect the judging practices
of federal trial courts, I focus on federal appellate courts in this Article because my interest
is in the federal constitutional problems that characterize various aspects of institutionalized
unpublication and because of the limited precedential value of district court opinions.
43 See Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1438 n.8.
44 Id. at 1437–38.
45 These “unpublished” opinions may or may not actually be “published” in the Federal
Appendix, on Lexis, Westlaw, a court database, or some other reporting medium.
46 For an account of this process as of 2000, see JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., CASE
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 7–14 (2000) [hereinafter
FJC CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES].
47 See Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 6, 10–17, 33–39 (describing the evidence of
delegated adjudication).
48 While it is common for “supervisory staff attorneys [to] have career positions . . . line
staff attorneys often have limited, [or presumptively limited employment] terms” of two or
three years and are frequently as junior as elbow clerks, being employed immediately after
law school graduation or within a year or two of graduation. FJC CASE MANAGEMENT
PROCEDURES, supra note 46, at 7.
but relevant bodies of doctrine on nonprecedential status rules and Article III power,
discussed in Part II, might provide.
Finally, in Part IV, registering both the practical limitations on “guarding the
guardians”41 in context, and the evidence of the widespread institutional and cultural
failure of national judicial ethics implicated in nonprecedential status rules, I move
through the analysis of Article III power that results from that engagement to the
Article’s conclusion:  the generation of a doctrine of Article III duty.42  That account
is informed by the stakes involved in Article III judging of “others” in the “post-9/11
constitutional” judging context.
I. HISTORY
A. Nonprecedential Status Rules; Delegated Adjudication; and Abbreviated
Appellate Processes
Unreported judicial opinions in the U.S. are as old as the inauguration of West’s
national reporter service.43  However, institutionalized unpublication developed in
the federal courts of appeals in the middle of the twentieth century.44  It combines
the issuing of a so-called “unpublished,” or not officially reported, opinion45 with
the assigning of the case, generally at the outset, to a separate judging track (“the
screening track”).46
The screening track proceeds without oral argument and terminates in the writing
of an unpublished opinion—and often the making of the judgment itself47—by a junior
court staff member, an elbow clerk, or a staff attorney,48 with more or less adequate
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49 See, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracy
and Scholarship, 21 MICH. J. L. REFORM 623, 628–29 (1988); Richman & Reynolds, Elitism,
supra note 6, at 275 (noting that “[i]n most cases . . . [c]lerks and central staff screen the
appeals”).
50 Compare FJC CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES, supra note 46, at 33–34 tbl.18
(summarizing circuits’ criteria for nonpublication of opinions), with id. at 7 (noting that “[i]n
some courts, [the staff attorneys] concentrate on pro se cases”), and id. at 10 tbl.5 (noting that
in the Fifth Circuit “[s]taff attorneys do initial screening for pro se cases, prisoner cases chal-
lenging conditions of confinement, habeas corpus cases, civil federal question cases, immi-
gration cases, cases in which the United States is a party, civil rights cases other than Title VII,
and Social Security cases”).
51 See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 6, at 275–76.
52 See id. at 281.
53 See William M. Richman, Rationing Judgeships Has Lost Its Appeal, 24 PEPP. L. REV.
911, 913 (1997).
54 See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 6, at 286.
55 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99–100, 104, 105 (1999) (concluding that while “contrary
to popular media accounts, defendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported
ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court level. Of those
cases that are appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of reported cases. These
results are worse than results found in comparable areas of the law; only prisoner rights cases
fare as poorly. . . . The plaintiff win rate in employment discrimination cases at the district
court level, for example, is four times higher in published than in unpublished opinions,” and,
thus, that “it appears that reliance on publicly available opinions overstates plaintiffs’ success
rates both at trial and on appeal”).
56 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Gresham’s Law Revisited: Expedited Processing
Techniques and the Allocation of Appellate Resources, 6 JUST. SYS. J. 372, 381–83 (1981)
(concluding from his case study of institutionalized unpublication in a state appellate court,
which tested his thesis and the conclusions of other scholars of institutionalized unpublication,
that hierarchical allocation of adjudicatory resources to differing classes of cases negatively
affected outcomes in judicially unpopular criminal appeals, and suggesting both that court
staff reversed criminal appeals less frequently than judges, and that differential merit did not
explain the difference in outcomes); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking
or genuine supervision by the formally issuing panel.  The original assignment to
this track during the “screening” process may itself be made by staff rather than by
judges,49 and although circuits usually have rational criteria— contained in each
court’s local unpublished opinion rule— for labeling an opinion “unpublished,” these
criteria are frequently not the operative basis for putting cases on the screening track.50
Rather, as indicated in the Introduction, certain types of appeals and/or the appeals
of certain types of appellants are diverted there when they enter the court:  collateral
criminal appeals, prison conditions appeals, social security appeals,51 veterans’ bene-
fits appeals,52 asylum appeals, and civil rights appeals53 of varying kinds.  The govern-
ment, often in the form of an administrative agency, is frequently the appellee.54
Appellants do disproportionately poorly when their cases are “decided” this way;55
there is some good empirical evidence that this pattern of outcomes does not reflect
the merits of their cases.56 Rather, as I have argued elsewhere,57 the poor outcomes
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Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 71, 117, 119 (2001) (concluding that it “appears . . . that unpublished [unfair labor prac-
tices] decisions [in the federal courts of appeals] increasingly rejected union claims between
1987 and 1993, while published opinions showed no such tendency,” and that “outcomes
among unpublished opinions [in National Labor Relations Board cases] showed significant
associations with political party affiliation, specific professional experiences, and other char-
acteristics of judges adjudicating the cases”); Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9,
at 1495–1507. Lauren Robel argues:
Decisions that result in nonpublication have been made in gross
rather than individually, at least on the initial level, and judges have few
incentives to examine these initial decisions closely. Existing data reveal
that judges rarely disagree with the initial decision to decide an appeal on
the briefs alone. This means that staff determinations about the relative
merits of the cases almost always prevail, and as noted above, staff deter-
minations may be guided largely by the subject matter of the opinion.
In effect, then, the determination not to publish occurs very early in
the appellate process, and necessarily so, for to delay the publication de-
cision until after an opinion is written would be to lose the time savings
the plans hope to achieve by having judges write with nonpublication
in mind. Yet it seems unlikely that it will usually be possible to predict
the information value of an opinion before it is written. In fact, many
judges have noted how frequently a case’s complexities are revealed
through the process of writing an opinion. It seems likely, therefore, that
an opinion’s ultimate information value would be hard to predict at the
time when the publication decisions are usually made.
All of the circuits have mechanisms by which members of the panel
of judges that decides the case can force a decision’s publication. Avail-
able information suggests, though, that panel members rarely do this in
cases that have been initially identified for nonpublication by staff, per-
haps because in many circuits these opinions are drafted by central staff
rather than the judges themselves or their own clerks. If the opinions are
drafted by staff, judges will have little investment in the final product.
Even if a staff attorney, then, believes that the decision warrants publi-
cation, that attorney will have to do additional work to justify a publi-
cation decision, and the judges will have to do additional work to gain
confidence in the staff attorney’s product (or worse, draft an entirely new
opinion themselves). In the face of these extra efforts, institutional pres-
sures operate to preserve the initial decision identifying a case for non-
publication.
Robel, Myth of the Disposable Opinion, supra note 6, 953–54; see also Pether, Sorcerers,
supra note 28, at 42–44 (interpreting data analysis in an empirical study of Ninth Circuit
asylum cases, see David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and
Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817 (2005), and concluding that while
“no matter the party or president who appointed the judge, asylum seekers do worse in un-
published decisions that published ones, although they do worse in the face of Republican
panels than Democratic ones. . . . [C]lerks and staff attorneys, aggregated, tend to decide
cases against asylum seekers, finding for them in the range of 7.5% to 20.5% of cases, well
short of the rate for even Republican-appointed panels, with the difference between the pro-
portion of unpublished opinions finding against asylum-seekers in Republican and Democratic
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panels plausibly being attributable to the effect of judicial ideology on decisions made in
chambers by elbow clerks”).
57 See Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28.
58 Id. at 53–60.
59 Id. at 33–40.
60 A decision not to grant appellate review; Richman and Reynolds rightly label this
certiorari. See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 6, at 277.
61 See Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 9–17.
62 Nor do I expect that in a national adjudicatory context that has institutionalized dele-
gation of a broad range of adjudicatory duties to elbow clerks, despite evidence, for example,
that Supreme Court clerks manipulate “cert pool” decisions for naked if naïve and paranoid
reasons of professional advancement, see Stephanie Ward, Clerks Avoid Getting Their DIGs
In: They Just Say No to Cert Petitions, as the Court’s Docket Shrinks, ABA J., Mar. 18, 2007,
and has not adopted front-end or transparent appellate load management techniques used
elsewhere in the common law world, such as adopting a default rule that losing litigants bear
their opponents’ as well as their own costs, or explicit criteria for bringing even primary appeals,
most of my readership would dissent from Judge Wald’s conclusion that it is “especially
unreal” to expect judges to “do every speck of their work themselves.” Patricia M. Wald, The
Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42
MD. L. REV. 766, 766 (1983). I do, however, agree with Justice Alito that delegated adjudica-
tory practices such as those employed by the Ninth Circuit have gone too far. See infra note 69
and accompanying text.
63 For example, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), providing for appeals as of right from final
decisions, inter alia, of District courts. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1292, §§1294–1296 (2006).
64 See Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 11–16, 33–37 (surveying evidence about who
in the courts of appeals reads what in adjudicating appeals).
may be explained by a court culture that disparages these matters and litigants,58 and
by shoddy decisional practices59 that often mean that rather than a genuine appellate
review by a panel of Article III judges, what the litigant gets is a denial of certiorari60
based on unsafe grounds61 and made by a junior staff member.
I am not contending here either that every appeal merits oral argument, nor that
more than what is legally required by the standard of review prescribed for any cate-
gory of appellate review should be delivered in any case.62  Rather, at least as long as
the legislature specifies and the circuit courts hold themselves out as providing appeals
to an Article III court as of right,63 I am suggesting that there should be limits to internal
court delegation of Article III appellate power to staff that exceed the limits placed
on delegation of adjudicatory duties to bankruptcy and magistrate judges; that such
limits should, at minimum, reflect standards and practices of supervision and training
that make the courts confident that decisions made in the name of Article III judges
are likely to be soundly based; and that adjudicatory practices are likewise designed
and implemented with safe and fair decision making as firmly in mind as adminis-
trative convenience and the efficient rationing of limited adjudicatory resources.
This latter limit would mean, at minimum, an end to “deciding” appeals in cases
where the actual—and, arguably, also the nominal—adjudicator has not read such
appellate documentation as exists,64 and the consistent providing of transparent and
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65 Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI L. REV. 1371, 1376 (1995) [hereinafter Wald, Rhetoric of Results].
66 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 616 (1997); United States v. Edge Broad. Co.,
509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3 (1993); Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001); Robel, Myth of the Disposable Opinion, supra
note 6, at 953–54; Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 312–13 (1990);
Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note 65.
67 See, e.g., Williams, 256 F.3d at 261 (Smith, J., dissenting) (criticizing successive Fifth
Circuit holdings, less than two years apart, in an unpublished an published opinion
respectively, that Dallas Area Rapid Transit did and did not have Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit); see also Merritt & Brudney, supra note 56 (noting that their study
uncovered “a surprising number of reversals, dissents, and concurrences . . . suggest[ing] that
panels authoring unpublished opinions reach some results with which other reasonable
judges would disagree,” and concluding that “failing to give unpublished opinions
precedential effect raises the very specter described by the Eighth Circuit [in Anastasoff]: that
like cases will be decided in unlike ways”).
68  Mauro, supra note 31 (quoting Kozinski); Kozinski Letter, supra note 34.
69 Samuel A. Alito, How Did We Get Here? Where Are We Going?, Keynote Address
at the Washington and Lee University Law Review Symposium: Have We Ceased to be a
Common Law Country? A Conversation on Unpublished, Depublished, Withdrawn and Per
Curiam Opinions (Mar. 18, 2005), available at http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/alito_unpublished
.pdf.
informative, if brief, reasons for judicial decisions.  It would also require establish-
ing and adhering to procedures ensuring that screening decisions are informed, in-
dependent, searching, and made by judges rather than staff, and conducting regular
audits to uncover and prevent what Judge Wald called “danger signals includ[ing] the
presence of obviously difficult issues or the predominance of certain kinds of cases
(for example § 1983 prisoner cases) on one track, inconsistencies between published
and unpublished results and rationales, and widely differing rates of published and
unpublished opinions among different judges,”65 all of which proliferate in the current
institutionalized unpublication system.66  Finally, as long as nonprecedential status
rules persist, meaningful appellate review also requires the development of research
protocols and information management practices that minimize the arbitrary decision
making authorized by nonprecedential status rules.67  Judge Alito put my position
more succinctly when, discussing Judge Kozinski’s revelations about the processing
of unpublished opinions in the Ninth Circuit,68 he said, “If these comments are accu-
rate, the described practices should be changed.”69
Further, while adjudicating the volume of federal appellate litigation clearly
requires law reform—my own suggestions to this end would include the creating of
a class of appropriately qualified judicial adjuncts resembling the federal magistracy
and bankruptcy judges but appointed under Article III; the establishing of independent,
adequately resourced, and effective federal ombuds to investigate and resolve the
majority of prison conditions complaints where appropriate; and reforming underlying
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70 For an especially thoughtful account of rational law reform solutions to the problem of
appellate volume, see Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul
of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11.
71 Kozinski Letter, supra note 34. It is worth noting in context that Ninth Circuit judges
produce an average of twenty published opinions a year. See Alex Kozinski & Stephen
Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We Don’t Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions,
CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43–44.
72 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2001).
73 See Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 22–23.
74 There is undoubted validity in these claims. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying
Judicial Activism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 768 (2006)
(“The federal courts of appeals in 2003 faced more than fifteen times as many cases as in 1960.
While the number of judges has increased over this same period, expansion has not kept pace
with the dockets. Appeals per judge have grown by some 450% over this same period.”). How-
ever, there is good evidence that much of the “problem” is at least exacerbated by judicial
opposition to creating more federal judgeships because of fears of diluting the prestige of the
office, and irrational and obtuse or disingenuous allocation of adjudicatory resources. See
Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 30. Further, the judiciary has been clear since the inaugu-
ration of institutionalized unpublication that it was certain types of appeals, not overall volume,
that needed aggressive management. See, e.g., Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal
Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1485, 1493 (1995) (“[A]s the docket is ‘dumbed-down’ by an overwhelming number of
routine or trivial appeals, judges become accustomed to seeking routine methods of case dis-
position. . . . The situation is like that of a competitive tennis player forced to spend the bulk
of his time rallying with novices. Just as the player’s competitive edge will erode from lack
of peer contact, so are judges’ legal talents jeopardized by a steady diet of minor appeals.”).
75 Reynolds and Richman give the most complete account of the process, although they do
not register the leading role the Fourth Circuit played in developing institutionalized unpubli-
cation. See William J. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1167, 1168–72 (1978).
primary adjudication practices in areas that produce high volumes of appeals with a
view to producing independent, good-quality, first-tier adjudication and reducing the
demands for appellate adjudication70—it is difficult to credit the intellectual honesty
of judicial claims that nonprecedential status rules are necessary and should apply
to the vast majority of federal courts of appeals merits decisions because the judges
need to be free to produce what, with reasonable frequency, may be more than eighty
drafts71 of a small corpus of super-precedential opinions whose authors imagine that
this extravagant skewing of scarce adjudicatory resources can foreclose the interpret-
ability72 that many would uncontroversially hold to be characteristic of common law
adjudication.  This is especially the case where members of the federal appellate bench
oppose an increase in its size in order to preserve the elite status of their office.73
The official story of the development of nonprecedential status rules, based on
the discourse of an overwhelming volume of appeals and an unmanageable archive
of precedent,74 is that institutionalized unpublication was the product of a formal law
reform process that was first instigated in 1964, and took place in the mid-1970s.75
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76 See Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and the
Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 769–70 (2004).
77 Id. at 770 n.28 (quoting BD. OF THE FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORT TO APRIL MEETING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (Mar. 21,
1972)).
78 For example, a poorly reasoned case would generally be agreed to have less precedential
value than a well-reasoned one, and a leading case more precedential value than one applying
a settled rule of law to a non-novel factual scenario.
79 FJC CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES, supra note 46, at 33 tbl.18.
80 See, e.g., Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972);
Williams, supra note 76, at 770–71.
81 See Williams, supra note 76 at 770.
82 Id. at 770–71 (alteration in original) (citing STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL
OPINIONS: A REP. OF THE COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES OF THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE 20 (Aug. 1973)).
83 Id. at 771 (internal quotations omitted).
Nonprecedential status rules were not, however, a product of that reform process;76
rather, they grew up, without law reform rationalization, alongside institutionalized
unpublication.  According to one legal historian, when the Federal Judicial Center
reported to the Judicial Conference in 1972 that circuits should establish “publica-
tion plans,” while it
observed that unpublished opinions would not require the work
necessary for an opinion “intended to enter the body of prece-
dent,” that oblique reference to the precedential value of opinions
was not understood as a prescriptive point—that unpublished
opinions should be assigned no precedential value—but rather
as a descriptive one—that unpublished opinions in fact lack
precedential value.77
The concept of relative precedential authority seems unexceptionable.78  How-
ever, it has limits:  for example, that only four circuits prescribe publication of
opinions that “appl[y] an established rule of law to a factual situation significantly
different from that in published opinions”79 would on some views fall short of what
transparency, predictability, fairness, and a principled common law method require.
Those court insiders responsible for developments in institutionalized unpubli-
cation have entertained fears that nonprecedential status rules exceed constitutional
limits on eradicating precedential status by fiat.80  Indeed, when in 1973 one of the
bodies involved in reform of federal appellate court publication practices “endorsed
the need for a selective publication plan [in the federal courts of appeals] and drafted
a model rule,”81 it expressed the view that including a nonprecedential status rule in
the model rule “was inadvisable”82 because it would “take[ ] us into a morass of
jurisprudence.”83  At once echoing and focusing this anxiety, during the recent battle
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84 Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate
Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure
30 (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/app0803.pdf (noting that FRAP
32.1 “takes no position on whether refusing to treat an ‘unpublished’ opinion as binding
precedent is constitutional”).
85 See Jones, 465 F.2d at 1094–96.
86 See id. at 1094 (“[A]ny decision is by definition a precedent.”).
87 See id. at 1093–94.
88 Id. at 1094 (holding that its process of “screening” collateral criminal appeals, using staff
to process them, and disposing of them via unpublished opinions “accords with due process”
and the court’s “duty as Article 3 judges”).
89 Id.
to pass FRAP 32.1, prospectively ending citation bans formerly applied by local court
rules to unpublished opinions, those leading the rule change process self-consciously
stayed away from the nonprecedential status rules that the circuits still maintain,
because they were worried about the constitutionality question.84
In fact, nonprecedential status rules, like institutionalized unpublication, have their
origin in the immediate post-Brown period, 1956–1957, and, like institutionalized un-
publication, were inaugurated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.85  While the formal enactment of nonprecedential status rule postdated insti-
tutionalized unpublication, then, during the time of and in at least the geographical
heart of “massive resistance,” the court which began institutionalized unpublication,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, also began both the prac-
tice of delegating Article III power to an institution it likewise inaugurated, the staff
attorneys, and the expression of the felt necessity of treating unpublished opinions
as nonprecedential.86  Additionally, it registered at least some level of anxiety about
the constitutionality of its own “peculiar institution.”87
In Jones v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit focused on ultra vires Article III and due process concerns in
indirectly asserting the constitutionality of those aspects of institutionalized unpub-
lication that it invented:  denying precedential value to unpublished opinions, dele-
gating at least part of the Article III judicial function in particular types of appeals,
and developing the abbreviated appellate “review” used in these screening track
cases.88  It is worth quoting from Jones the language of that constitutional defense:
We believe that our screening procedures and disposition by un-
reported memorandum decisions accords with due process and
our duty as Article 3 judges, but we confess its imperfection.  We
concede, of course, that any decision is by definition a precedent,
and that we cannot deny litigants and the bar the right to urge upon
us what we have previously done.  But because memorandum
decisions are not prepared with the assistance of the bar, we
think it reasonable to refuse to treat them as precedent within the
meaning of the rule of stare decisis.89
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90 See id. For a flavor of the debates over the balance of federal and state power and the
role of federal courts in habeas actions in this period, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 532
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964) (describing the
increasing federal court control over state criminal cases during the first eleven years of the
Warren Court, 1953–1964).
91 Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1446.
92 Alex Kozinski, The Appearance of Propriety, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 19.
93 Kozinski Letter, supra note 34, at 5. This begs questions about how a judgment can
be detached from the reasons for reaching it, and how a “result” detached from reasoning by
an Article III judge can fairly be called a judgment.
Here, then, is the earliest suggestion—cast as a denial—that delegation and abbre-
viated appellate review violate the Constitution, linked explicitly to treating the un-
published opinions that result as having nonprecedential status.
In its earliest version, institutionalized unpublication of judicial opinions was
characterized by solipsistic and convenience-driven law reform and a discourse of
necessity masking selective application of the practice to classes of litigants unpopular
among judges:  those lodging pro se collateral criminal appeals;90 there is some evi-
dence that in addition to pro se prisoner post-conviction or “habeas” appeals, insti-
tutionalized unpublication “was developed in response to (some) federal judges’
perception that they were being overwhelmed . . . by civil rights . . . litigation.”91
B. Living History:  What Really Goes On in the Sausage Factory
Nonprecedential status rules do not stand alone.  They are necessitated by and
provide cover for other practices, which raise additional constitutional questions about
both the delegation of Article III power and unfairness or procedural deficiencies of
various kinds.  The latter result both from the delegation of some of the work involved
in deciding specific classes of appeals to staff, and from specific types of appeals
being designated for the screening track.
Today, on the Ninth Circuit, (which, thanks to Chief Judge Kozinski, is the
circuit whose current judging practices we have the most information about), the
forty percent of all Ninth Circuit opinions that emerge from “process[ing]”92 on the
screening track and in which a “merits ruling” is issued are
drafted by [staff attorneys] and presented to a panel of three
judges in camera, with an average of five to ten minutes devoted
to each case.  During a two- or three-day monthly session, a panel
of three judges may issue 100 to 150 such rulings.  We are very
careful to ensure that the result we reach in every case is right,
and I believe we succeed.  But there is simply no time or oppor-
tunity for the judges to fine-tune the language of the disposition,
which is presented as a final draft by staff attorneys.93
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL SOLIPSISM 973
94 Kozinski, The Appearance of Propriety, supra note 92.
95 Id. at 19–20; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 162 (2d ed. 1996) (recording the “tendency to sign on the dotted line with little real
consideration of the case”).
96 Schiltz, Citation, supra note 6, at 33. Schiltz does not confine this account to the
activities of the Ninth Circuit.
97 See David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2004).
98 See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 6, at 290.
99 See ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITING UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS IN FEDERAL APPEALS 76 (2005) [hereinafter FJC REPORT] (claiming that while
other circuits “employ legions of staff attorneys to process” unpublished opinions, on the
Federal Circuit “non-precedential opinions are handled in chambers”); see also FJC CASE
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES, supra note 46, at 8–10, tbl.5 (indicating that, as of 2000, in the
Tenth Circuit all screening is done by judges, and that on the Third and Fifth Circuits some
screening is done by judges).
100 See Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note 65 (noting “danger signals” in screening
practices).
101 See Former Chief Judge Edward R. Becker, Statement to Advisory Committee on
Appellate rules (Apr. 13, 2004), http://nonpublication.com/Becker_statement.pdf (noting, in
relation to Third Circuit practice, that “[m]ost [unpublished opinions] are not cursory; in fact
they average over seven pages. . . . [T]hey uniformly set forth the ratio decidendi of the
decisions. These opinions are prepared in chambers under the close supervision of the judge.
They are usually drafted by clerks but, to repeat, carefully reviewed and edited by Judges. In
On the contemporary Ninth Circuit, the staff attorneys, not the judges,
read the briefs, review the record, research the law, and prepare a
proposed disposition, which they then present to a panel of three
judges during a practice we call “oral screening”—oral, because
the judges don’t see the briefs in advance, and because they gen-
erally rely on the staff attorney’s oral description of the case in
deciding whether or not to sign on to the proposed disposition.94
It is unsurprising, then, that “[a]fter you decide a few dozen such cases on a screen-
ing calendar, your eyes glaze over, your mind wanders, and the urge to say O.K. to
whatever is put in front of you becomes almost irresistible,”95 particularly as “[i]t is
common for a panel to spend as little as five minutes on an unpublished opinion.”96
The federal courts are a black box97 into which outsider scholar vision is partial,98
but what slips or is passed out suggests that practices about delegating Article III judg-
ing to staff vary across the federal appellate system and within courts.  Some courts
use judges themselves to screen cases to the staff processing track.99  Hopefully, some
actually follow their own criteria for screening or heed former Judge Wald about the
kinds of screening practices that should give a court pause.100  Some courts rely less
on staff attorneys than do the Ninth and Second Circuits.101  Courts can, too, train
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my chambers they are written by me”); see also Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of
Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 83–84 (2004)
(noting that Seventh Circuit unpublished opinions in some cases in which an Anders brief has
been filed are comparatively thoroughly reasoned, that in the Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit
even “canned” unpublished opinions “provide some reason beside boilerplate,” and that
“dispositions of the Sixth Circuit are often of moderate length or longer”). Wasby’s addition
of “like those in the Ninth Circuit,” id. at 84, to that final phrase both conflicts with his earlier
account of the use of uninformative formulaic opinions on the Ninth Circuit, id. at 79–80,
and suggests that reliance on staff attorneys may enable more relatively lengthy unpublished
opinions, without necessarily improving their quality. I have recently been (reliably) informed
that the judges of at least one circuit deal with staff dispositions of screened cases via email,
not even meeting for the screening panel procedures used by the Ninth Circuit.
102 See, e.g., Wasby, supra note 101, at 88–89, nn.94 & 97–98 (including the opinion that
“[t]here must be better ways to make our clerks feel good” than publishing their “slightly
revised bench memos” as unpublished opinions (quoting Memorandum from Judge Alfred
T. Goodwin to Ninth Circuit Bench Colleagues (Aug. 4, 1998))).
103 See Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 34 n.213 (reporting a conversation with a
former Ninth Circuit clerk indicating that in the chambers in which the former clerk served,
much work was done in chambers to prepare the judge for screening panels).
104 See Schiltz, Citation, supra note 6, at 35 (noting that unpublished opinions are “written
quickly by court staff or law clerks, and judges give them only cursory attention”); see also
Carolyn Dineen King, Comment, A Matter of Conscience, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 955, 957–58
(1991) (quoting William Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Ct., The Cult of the Robe,
Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1976)); Hon. Stephen
Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 32–33 (1990).
105 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 61 (2005).
and supervise staff well, and seek to appoint staff attorneys who have the intellect,
character, knowledge, skills, and practice experience to do better work in exercising
Article III power than is often the case.
Some judges see their responsibility to the bulk of the federal courts’ judging prac-
tice as more than that of editors of draft opinions.102  Some judges on screening panels
do try to have all the relevant documents read and the law researched in chambers by
themselves and/or their elbow clerks before participating in mass oral presentation
by staff and virtual opinion-signing (or rather signing off on) sessions.103
There is evidence that at least some courts do none of these things.104  Judge
Posner has written that
[t]oday, most judicial opinions, including many Supreme Court
opinions, are ghostwritten by law clerks.  Many appellate judges
have never actually written a judicial opinion.  Some judges do
expansive editing of their law clerks’ opinion drafts, others not,
and this is the pattern in the Supreme Court as well as in the lower
courts.105
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106 See Kozinski, The Appearance of Propriety, supra note 92 (noting that on the Ninth
Circuit, judges on screening panels do not read even the briefs in advance of “deciding” cases).
107 See Wasby, supra note 101, at 93 & n.116 (noting the admission by Ninth Circuit Judge
Goodwin that “we spend very little judge time now” on screening track cases); see also id.
at 95 (noting Judge Goodwin’s acknowledgment that judges “rely on recent graduates from
supposedly excellent law schools for the writing and most of the editing” of unpublished
opinions and “we all know that a lot of that stuff is written by externs and checked by law
clerks” (quoting E-mails from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to Stephen L. Wasby (Aug. 4, 2000
and Apr. 6, 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108 See Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 14–15 (analyzing evidence demonstrating that
staff may decide cases without reference to any part of the appellate record).
109 See id. at 25–26 (noting that elbow clerks can miss even Supreme Court cases in doing
research); see also FJC REPORT, supra note 99, at 68, 70–71, 73.
110 Kozinski Letter, supra note 34.
111 For evidence of this phenomenon, see Wasby, supra note 101, at 78 (citing an unpub-
lished study, Michael Wepsiec & Stephen L. Wasby, Ninth Circuit Border Searches: Doctrines
and Inconsistencies (2000)). Wasby’s generally uncritical account of unpublished opinion cases
was based on privileged access to the decisional practices of the Ninth Circuit, see id. at 69,
and he notes that in “chambers [of judges formally signing an opinion but] not doing the
writing, . . . the judge may simply direct that no cite check be performed or may ask only for
a ‘lite cite check’ rather than a more extensive one,” id. at 95. See also Schiltz, Citation,
supra note 6, at 33 (noting that “because unpublished opinions are hurriedly drafted by staff
and clerks, and because they receive little attention from judges, they often contain statements
of law that are imprecise or inaccurate”).
112 See Schiltz, Much Ado, supra note 34, at 1483 (noting that judges who opposed the pas-
sage of FRAP 32.1 opposed it because they thought it would lead to the end of nonprecedential
status rules: “The courts of appeals have issued hundreds of thousands of unpublished opinions,
and judges have no idea what is in them. They know, however, that those opinions generally are
not as well crafted as published opinions and often were not carefully scrutinized by any judge”).
113 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
114 JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT
ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
148 (2002).
115 See Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 25–27.
Judging is delegated overtly for reasons of efficiency; thus, it is unlikely that most
or even many judges read the documents,106 or do more than edit or sign off on com-
pleted opinions—that would duplicate work.107  Sometimes even the staff, the people
actually making the decisions, may not read the papers.108  And, thus, it is unsurprising
that nonprecedential status rules exist because the people who are doing most of the
Article III judging get it wrong.109
It is not just nuances of language or “apparent departures from published prece-
dent”110—getting the articulation of the applicable law wrong111—for which clerks
or staff attorneys are responsible.  It can also be getting the decision itself “wrong,”
by making that decision,112 for example, without reading the transcript of the under-
lying trial,113 or without sufficient knowledge and experience to make the judgment
the matter calls for,114 or with inadequate basic legal skills to do the research115 and
analysis that might lead to a sound review to the required standard.
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116 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
117 See Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1504–07; Pether, Sorcerers, supra
note 28, at 20–21, 27–32, 39–45.
118 Using the (resource-expensive) panel system as cover for staff decision making rather
than, for example, using randomized single judge review to grant or deny certiorari, or alter-
natively to decide appeals, not only lacks transparency, but also compromises the efficiency
end that is used to justify the means of the system of delegation.
119 See POSNER, supra note 95 (noting that in screened cases, conferences between the
judges on the panel may also be abandoned, increasing the unlikelihood that any real judicial
consideration of such an appeal will take place). It also tends to produce the “affirmance effect”
registered by Guthrie and George. See Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of
Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of
Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357 (2005).
120 See, e.g., Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 56–58.
121 JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DECIDING CASES WITHOUT
ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS 72–74 (1987).
122 Compare Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 71, which reasons that nonprecedential
opinions are necessary to keep published, precedential law “clean” and that it “is important
to omit irrelevant facts [from unpublished opinions] that could form a spurious ground for
distinguishing the opinion,” with Wasby, supra note 101, at 79, which notes that “there are
numerous [Ninth Circuit] memdispos containing extensive fact statements,” which Wasby
speculates “may result from the court’s issuing an only slightly recycled clerk-prepared bench
memorandum as its disposition.”
There is also evidence that the staff, exercising most Article III appellate power,
practice systematically biased anti-appellant decision making,116 often in cases where
the appellee is the federal government or one of its administrative agencies.  This has
a negative impact on members of already structurally subordinated groups.117
Further, when basic documents are not read by anyone, or by anyone with the
competence to discern reversible error, for example, what happens on the screening
track118 may not be genuine appellate review, albeit conducted by staff rather than
judges, but inadequate second-class processing that functions de facto as a certiorari
process.119  Indeed, just like meaningful appellate review, the implicit value of panel
appellate review ostensibly practiced in the courts of appeals—the avoidance of bias
or partiality—is functionally undermined when the exercise of Article III judicial
power is de facto delegated to a single junior and often inexperienced court staff
member.  This is particularly the case when that staff member works in a culture that
stigmatizes screened cases as frivolous or boring or lacking merit.120
These employees work in an environment that engenders disrespect for certain
types of litigants, and boredom and professional status anxiety in deciding their
cases.121  The work culture encourages shoddy decision-making practices, ranging
from overt disparagement of litigants, to not reading key documents, to making de-
cisions for federal appellate courts when one knows little about the world or the law,
to generating disingenuous rationales for institutionalized unpublication,122 to nor-
malizing a decision-making charade in which one appears before three judges who
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123 See supra notes 104, 107.
124 See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 369, 375 (2006); Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 6, at 326–27, 331–34
(documenting the federal courts’ encouragement of jurisdiction stripping).
125 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 124, at 372–73.
126 See, e.g., id. at 373–77.
127 I have in mind here the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act imposing filing
fees on claims made by even indigent prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (2006), and the
“three strikes” bar, id. § 1915(g).
128 Pether, Inequitable Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1437.
129 See Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 45 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 955 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1992).
typically know little and may know nothing about the cases they are deciding that you
can decide for them, and dispose of scores of cases in a short session.123
Although litigants have appeals as of right to the federal courts of appeals, what
happens in a wrongly or sloppily or unsafely or arbitrarily decided case is effectively
a certiorari decision masquerading as an appeal as of right based on the applicable
standard of review.  Many of these cases cluster in areas where deep-seated socio-
legal problems produce high rates of appeals, where the government is the target of
the lawsuit, and the paradigmatic governmental response (often by more than one of
the three—or four—branches) is to jurisdiction strip,124 to attempt to control decision
making by non-independent officers both by removing decisional responsibility from
them125 and by employing disciplinary mechanisms to encourage them to decide against
litigants,126 and to impose penalties that are designed to discourage appeals.127
C. History of Unconstitutionality Jurisprudence
Judge Arnold was not, as indicated above, the first federal appellate judge to
manifest an awareness of the constitutional problem constituted by nonprecedential
status rules.  The Fourth Circuit judges who began the practice of “institutionalized
unpublication”128 in the late 1950s both branded these opinions nonprecedential,129
and registered the intellectual embarrassment inherent in doing so.130  They claimed,
defensively, that there were no Article III or due process problems with the various
institutionalized unpublication practices that denying precedential status to unpub-
lished opinions justified and enabled.131
The quickly silenced murmur of the collective judicial conscience in Richmond
in 1972 was next discernible two decades later in Denver.  On Valentine’s Day in 1992,
the entire bench of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit handed
down a curious opinion, published in the Federal Reporter under the cumbersome
title Re:  Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, Adopted Nov. 18.132  The
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133 See Williams, supra note 76, at 778 & n.64.
134 Re Rules, 955 F.2d at 37 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 37 n.1 (“In Jones v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, the Fourth Circuit
expressed the view that its procedure for screening and disposing of cases by unpublished
decisions accords with due process and the court’s duty as Article 3 judges. However, although
the court said it would not treat its unpublished decisions as precedent and said it prefers they
not be cited, it acknowledged that it cannot deny litigants and the bar the right to urge upon
us what we have previously done. . . . [A]t least one commentator has expressed concern over
the due process and equal protection implications of no-citation rules adopted in the federal
courts.” (citations omitted)).
137 Id. (“In Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
the Court, in a single sentence disposition, denied leave for the petitioners to file petitions for
writs of mandamus and prohibition after the Seventh Circuit struck the petitioners’ citation
of an unpublished decision. In Bowder [sic] v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois,
the Court did not mention the no-citation question, although it had granted certiorari on the
issue.” (citations omitted)). David Cleveland catalogs an additional two denials of certiorari
before 1992. David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass, supra note 14 (manuscript at 4 n.14)
(citing Friedman v. Montgomery County, 489 U.S. 1042 (1996); Van Sant v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
475 U.S. 1082, 476 U.S. 1131 (1986)).
138 Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917
(1976). The Seventh Circuit’s reply brief in the certiorari application in Do-Right responded
in terms that suggest the relevance of the petitioners’ grounds for appeal to a consideration
of whether nonprecedential status rules and delegation of Article III power is within judicial
power. The circuit court argued that the “[petitioners’] case against the rule is grounded in
the doctrine of stare decisis,” which they classified as “judicially-created policy” rather than
constitutionally mandated: “Courts do modify and overrule their prior decisions. By definition,
therefore, courts do have authority to determine whether a given decision has value as a prece-
dent for future cases.” Dunn, supra note 17, at 143.
139 Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 258 (1978).
court ordered the publication of a previously suppressed dissent more than five
years old.133  Attacking the “essential [in]justice and fundamental [un]fairness” of non-
precedential status rules, Chief Judge Holloway went on to suggest that they may be
unconstitutional:  “to deny a litigant this right may well have overtones of a constitu-
tional infringement because of the arbitrariness, irrationality, and unequal treatment
of the rule.”134
Inferentially, the bases of the problematic constitutional status of the Tenth
Circuit’s nonprecedential status rule were (1) violations of both the due process guar-
antee of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,135 and (2) the suggestion that it was ultra vires Article III
judicial power.136
At that stage, the Supreme Court had passed up “two opportunities to rule on the
constitutionality of the Seventh Circuit’s no-citation rule,”137 denying certiorari in
one case138 and not reaching the issue in the second.139  It has since consistently denied
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140 Schmier v. Supreme Court of Ca., cert. denied, 543 U.S. 818 (2004). David Cleveland
documents an additional thirty denials. See Cleveland, Draining the Morass, supra note 14,
(manuscript at 4 n.14).
141 See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001); Anastasoff v. United States, 223
F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
142 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
143 Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
219, 226 (1999).
144 See, e.g., Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905 (“The judicial power of the United States is limited
by the doctrine of precedent. Rule 28A(i) allows courts to ignore this limit. If we mark an
opinion as unpublished, Rule 28A(i) provides that is not precedent. Though prior decisions
may be well-considered and directly on point, Rule 28A(i) allows us to depart from the law
set out in such prior decisions without any reason to differentiate the cases. This discretion
is completely inconsistent with the doctrine of precedent; even in constitutional cases, courts
have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.
Rule 28A(i) expands the judicial power beyond the limits set by Article III by allowing us com-
plete discretion to determine which judicial decisions will bind us and which will not. Insofar
as it limits the precedential effect of our prior decisions, the Rule is therefore unconstitutional.”
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
certiorari.140  Subsequent to those two cases, in what are arguably the two most fre-
quently cited cases in the literature on institutionalized unpublication, panels of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits successively ruled respectively that their circuits’ unpub-
lication rules were unconstitutional because they were ultra vires Article III power,
and constitutional.141
In Anastasoff, the Eighth Circuit held that the rule “that declares that unpublished
opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports
to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the ‘judicial.’”142  The author
of that opinion, Judge Richard Arnold, had the previous year (in an article highly
critical of the Eighth Circuit’s nonpublication rule) written:
Article III [judges] . . . can exercise no power that is not “judi-
cial.”  That is all the power that we have.  When a governmental
official, judge or not, acts contrary to what was done on a previous
day, without giving reasons, and perhaps for no reason other than
a change of mind, can the power that is being exercised properly
be called “judicial”?  Is it not more like legislative power, which
can be exercised whenever the legislator thinks best, and without
regard to prior decisions?  In other words, is the assertion that un-
published opinions are not precedent and cannot be cited a vio-
lation of Article III?143
In both opinion and article, Judge Arnold characterized unprincipled and unrea-
soned decision making of the kind justified and enabled by nonprecedential status
rules as akin to legislating.144
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145 Id. at 900 (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)). Beam is a case on the narrow ques-
tion of retroactive application of newly established precedent in civil cases, and the section
of the opinion cited, for all its relatively unexceptionable nature, was adopted by only two
Justices. Beam, 501 U.S. at 531. The concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, although likewise uttered in the case’s specific context, contains dicta
of some use to determining what the Supreme Court’s authority on the question of Article III
power provides. Justice Scalia writes:
“The judicial power of the United States” conferred upon this Court
and such inferior courts as Congress may establish, Art. III, § 1, must
be deemed to be the judicial power as understood by our common-law
tradition. That is the power “to say what the law is,” not the power to
change it. I am not so naïve (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense “make” law. But they make it as
judges make it, which is to say as though they were “finding” it—dis-
cerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed
to, or what it will tomorrow be. Of course this mode of action poses
“difficulties of a . . . practical sort,” when courts decide to overrule prior
precedent. But those difficulties are one of the understood checks upon
judicial lawmaking; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially
more free to “make new law,” and thus to alter in a fundamental way the
assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three branches.
Id. at 549 (citations omitted). Justices Souter and Stephens also identify the retrospective oper-
ation of newly announced precedent as being based on the “equality principle, that similarly
situated litigants should be treated the same.” Id. at 540. The Cohens citation is even more
tenuous: it indicates that dicta does not control subsequent cases.
[G]eneral expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection
with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a
subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason
of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is inves-
tigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which
may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case de-
cided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely
investigated.
19 U.S. at 399–400.
146 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
147 Id. at 904–05.
148 Id. at 905.
149 Id.
He relied for that characterization on the centrality to Article III power of a
principled understanding of precedent, which “must be applied in subsequent cases
to similarly situated parties,”145 “is based on reason, not fiat,”146 and may be departed
from “[i]f the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or if other exigent circum-
stances justify it,”147 providing that the “burden of justification” is discharged.148
This requires the giving of reasons.149
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150 Id. at 899–900.
151 See id. at 900.
152 See id. at 900–01.
153 Id. at 902 (“Hamilton, like Blackstone, recognized that a court ‘pronounces the law’
arising upon the facts of each case. [Hamilton] explained the law-declaring concept of judicial
power in the term, ‘jurisdiction’: ‘This word is composed of JUS and DICTIO, juris dictio,
or a speaking and pronouncing of the law,’ and concluded that the jurisdiction of appellate
courts, as a law-declaring power, is not antagonistic to the fact-finding role of juries.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
154 Thanks are due to Judith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor, Yale Law School, for this
insight.
155 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (“In addition to keeping the law stable, this doctrine is also
essential, according to Blackstone, for the separation of legislative and judicial power.”).
This rhetorical gesture makes an implicit appeal in a cultural context where “activist judge”
carries the same kind of ideological freight and invites the same kind of opprobrium as does
“political correctness” and “sexual preference.”
156 Id. at 901 (“In his discussion of the separation of governmental powers, Blackstone
identifies this limit on the ‘judicial power,’ i.e., that judges must observe established laws,
as that which separates it from the ‘legislative’ power and in which ‘consists one main pre-
servative of public liberty.’”).
157 Id. at 903 (“Hamilton anticipated that the record of federal precedents ‘must unavoid-
ably swell to a very considerable bulk. . . .’ But precedents were not to be recorded for their
own sake. He expected judges to give them ‘long and laborious study’ and to have a ‘compe-
tent knowledge of them.’ Likewise, Madison recognized ‘the obligation arising from judicial
expositions of the law on succeeding judges.’ Madison expected that the accumulation of
Judge Arnold framed his constitutional holding in Anastasoff in terms of an origi-
nalist theory of constitutional interpretation,150 the plausibility of which is discussed
in Part II.A.2.a.  However, Judge Arnold’s vision of Article III power is based on
equality of treatment by judges of those who appeal to the federal courts, and the
separation of powers understood as a check on unfettered or unprincipled exercises
of governmental power.151  Additionally, the emphasis on reasoned decision making
(of which that part of a judicial opinion that sets out what in other common law coun-
tries are called the “reasons for judgment” is the trace or symbolic performance) and
on making decisions based in something more than mere policy suggests that the
judicial power gestured towards by Judge Arnold152 is both distinctively legal rather
than political, and that the judge has a responsibility to the law as well as to those
on whom she passes judgment.
Judge Arnold’s rhetoric of reasoning emphasizes facticity,153 as well it might; it
is attentiveness to facticity which enables common law legal development or change.154
Such a model of the doctrine of precedent as necessary for legal change is not, how-
ever, the sum of Judge Arnold’s constitutional case.155  He expands on the constitu-
tional logic of the separation of Article III power, reasoning that the separation of
judicial and legislative power protects individual freedom.156  There is a collateral
invocation of judicial expertise,157 and Judge Arnold makes an appeal to the role of
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precedents would be beneficial: ‘[a]mong other difficulties, the exposition of the Constitution
is frequently a copious source, and must continue so until its meaning on all great points shall
have been settled by precedents.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
158 Id. at 902 n.12 (“In a government which is emphatically styled a government of laws,
the least possible range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge . . . perhaps nothing
conduces more to that object than the publication of reports. Every case decided is a check
upon the judge. He can not decide a similar case differently, without strong reasons, which,
for his own justification, he will wish to make public.” (quoting William Cranch, Preface,
1 Cranch iii (1804))).
159 Id. (“Other early authorities confirm the connection between the doctrine of precedent
and the separation of powers. See 1 Kent’s Commentaries, Lect. XXI at 479: ‘Those nations,
which have adopted the civil law as the main foundation of their own [recognize precedent
to a far less degree than our own]. . . . With them the necessity of judiciary independence upon
the executive, is not so clearly acknowledged. . . . It has been shown already that this inde-
pendence requires, in a considerable degree, the acknowledgment of precedential authority.’”
(alteration in original)).
160 See id. at 903.
161 See Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (vacating on
rehearing en banc the prior Anastasoff opinion).
162 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
163 Compare Anastasoff, 223 F.3d 898, with Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.
2001).
precedent and transparent and reasoned decision making in keeping the judiciary
honest.158  Emphasis is placed on democracy, and on the virtues that a common law
system has over a civil law system for constraining (implicitly tyrannical) royal or
executive power.159  As is characteristic of judicial and much scholarly discourse on
the purported unconstitutionality of nonprecedential status rules, then, Judge Arnold
wields a broad brush, sounding in fundamental constitutional values rather than the
intricacies of the available doctrine.160
Anastasoff was subsequently vacated as moot for reasons irrelevant to the
Article III constitutional point; this had the formal effect, nonetheless, of vacating its
constitutional holding.161  A year later, in Hart v. Massanari, Judge Alex Kozinski,
writing for a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held
constitutional the Ninth Circuit’s nonprecedential status rule.162
While the most material jurisprudential difference between the Anastasoff and
Hart opinions is arguably the differing account of the doctrine of precedent given in
each case, and the implications, derivable from Hart, that the U.S. federal courts are
not, strictly speaking, common law courts,163 these issues are beyond the scope of the
present Article.  The two opinions, however, have something in common of salience
here:  making substantively opposing arguments about what the limits of Article III
judicial power are (with respect to declaring opinions nonprecedential), both the
Anastasoff and Hart courts nonetheless appeal to the doxa of judicial restraint.
Judge Kozinski’s account of Article III power in Hart likewise differs from that
advanced in Anastasoff in that it seeks authority for a doctrine of Article III power
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164 For a brief scholarly endorsement of this position, see Greenwald & Schwarz, supra
note 14, at 1159–61.
165 Hart, 266 F.3d at 1160.
166 Id. at 1161 n.4.
167 Id. at 1160.
168 Id. at 1162.
169 Id. at 1163.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson, 277 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
174 Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
175 Smith v. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 484 F.3d 1281, 1283–84 (2007).
that is more than purely descriptive,164 that is, that has any content, in the explicit,
constitutionally textualized jurisdictional limitation to “rule only in ‘Cases’ or
‘Controversies’”;165 or in “explicit [constitutional] constraints, such as the require-
ments of due process, trial by jury, the availability of counsel in criminal cases, the
ex post facto clause and the prohibition against bills of attainder.”166
Concluding that “[t]he judicial power clause . . . has never before been thought
to encompass a constitutional limitation on how courts conduct their business,”167
Judge Kozinski advances an argument against recognizing the existence of a sub-
stantive Article III power, should one exist.  His argument is paradoxically framed in
terms of restraint and yet nakedly instrumentalist:  “If we nevertheless were to accept
Anastasoff’s premise that the phrase ‘judicial Power’ contains limitations separate
from those contained elsewhere in the Constitution, we should exercise considerable
caution in recognizing those limitations, lest we freeze the law into the mold cast in
the eighteenth century.”168
The dangers of constitutionalizing common law rules are enhanced “when the
constitutional rule in question is not explicitly written into the Constitution, but rather
is discovered for the first time in a vague, two-centuries-old provision.”169  Such rules
attract “[t]he risk that this will allow judges to pick and choose those ancient practices
they find salutary as a matter of policy, and give them constitutional status,”170 an
instrumentalist vice of which Judge Kozinski goes on to accuse Judge Arnold.171
Common law practices at the date of the drafting of the Constitution, he reasons,
should only be constitutionalized if “the practice in question was one the Framers con-
sidered so integral and well-understood that they did not have to bother stating it.”172
Since Hart, the Federal Circuit has likewise held its nonprecedential status rule
constitutional,173 and a member of the Fifth Circuit has agreed in a dissent with the
Arnold analysis.174  Additionally, in Smith, a disgruntled law school graduate who had
passed the Colorado Bar examination and the required ethics examination, but was
refused admission to the Colorado Bar “primarily” because he refused to submit to
a mental status examination, filed a series of suits in both state and federal courts.175
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176 Id. at 1284.
177 Id. at 1284–87.
178 For a detailed discussion of Vermeule’s proposal, see infra notes 260–69 and accom-
panying text.
179 See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 14, at 1161–66, for a short argument that citation
bans are infirm on both these First Amendment grounds. Relying on Anastasoff and English
sources, Drew Quitschau argues for the constitutionality of the doctrine of precedent based
on its limitation of Article III power, and additionally that citation bans violate the First Amend-
ment and a constitutional right of court access, which he locates in the First Amendment. See
Quitschau, supra note 15.
180 See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 17, at 142 (arguing that the only source for a right referred
to by the Jones Court as “the right to urge upon us what we have previously done” can be
“the due process clause” (quoting Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091,
Two of those suits involved First Amendment-based constitutional challenges to rules
of the Colorado Supreme Court and of the Tenth Circuit, based on their bestowing
nonprecedential status on unpublished opinions.176  The Tenth Circuit resolved both
challenges on the grounds that Smith did not have standing.177
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Predecessor Scholarship
Much of the scholarship on the constitutional problems of various aspects of insti-
tutionalized unpublication addresses local rules imposing citation bans of varying
degrees of rigidity, which have now been abolished, albeit prospectively.  There is a
much smaller universe of work on nonprecedential status rules.  Only part of it impli-
cates Article III.  Four significant contributions to the constitutionality analysis of non-
precedential status rules are made in both the jurisprudential core of Judge Arnold’s
reasoning in Anastasoff, and its historical sources; in an historical study of early “vested
property” cases, suggesting that the doctrine of precedent is critical to protecting indi-
vidual rights against state tyranny; in an analysis of the formal rule-making power
of federal courts; and in Adrian Vermeule’s proposal for a non-justiciability doctrine
in separation of powers adjudication.178
1. Non-Article III Arguments
Non-Article III arguments sound in due process, equal protection, and First
Amendment grounds, the last-mentioned encompassing restraint both on freedom of
speech and on the right to petition.179  The end of the citation bans both reduces the
significance of the First Amendment problems that had been identified with them, and
also reduces the likelihood that the Supreme Court would decide to grant certiorari
on that basis.  The equal protection and due process arguments generally suffer from
their being the apprentice scholarly work of students.180
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1094 (4th Cir. 1972))); see also Allen, supra note 14, at 574–91 (analyzing the constitutionality
of citation bans); Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process
Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 695, 718 (2001).
181 See Williams, supra note 76, at 795–98, 799–801, for a more detailed account of
this critique. See also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 577–78 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601–03 (1972).
182 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
183 See infra Parts II.B & II.C.1.
The success of any Due Process Clause-based constitutional claim depends on
establishing the loss of “life, liberty, or property.”181  A Due Process Clause-based
theory of the unconstitutionality of nonprecedential status rules would thus neither
reach the crux of what nonprecedential status rules formally authorize—the creation
of a binary system of precedential and nonprecedential opinions, and treating similarly
situated litigants differently—nor squarely address the denial of a meaningful appeal
that may result from delegation of adjudicatory power to underqualified and inade-
quately supervised staff, at least some of whose work demonstrates anti-appellant
bias.182  It would also affect a limited number of cases.  Additional procedural and
interpretive hurdles stand in the path of a successful challenge on due process grounds
to the constitutionality of nonprecedential status rules.183  Due process jurisprudence
also begs questions of what process is due, particularly in the context of appeals.  As
to equal protection challenges, proving an equal protection violation requires proving
intent, the doctrine features multiple standards, and there is in addition in most cases
the problem of proving an unconstitutional burden on a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
2. Article III Arguments
Scholarship on Article III and nonprecedential status rules clusters in three areas.
There is historical work addressing whether originalist or other historicist constitu-
tional hermeneutics answers the question as to whether nonprecedential status rules
are ultra vires Article III.  Then, there is narrow inherent judicial power work, which
seeks to determine whether federal courts possess the constitutional authority to
impose nonprecedential status rules as a result of the inherent power doctrine; and
narrow separation of powers work, which seeks to determine whether the federal legis-
lature could constitutionally end nonprecedential status rules by legislation or through
the federal courts’ rule-making process.  Finally, there is scholarship by established
federal courts and constitutional law scholars:  broad inherent Article III power work
drawn from the separation of powers literature; and a subset of work on the constitu-
tionality of the doctrine of precedent.
a. Originalist Fantasies:  The Arnold-Kozinski Debate and its Commentators
Judge Arnold’s argument for the unconstitutionality of nonprecedential status
rules in Anastasoff moves from the statement that “[t]he Framers accepted this
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184 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot
en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
185 Id. at 903–04 (citation omitted) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 377–78 (1833)). But see WILFRED J. RITZ ET AL.,
REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING
PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wyth Holt & L. H. LaRue eds., 1990) for a revisionist
history, inter alia, of Justice Story’s account of the operation of precedent in the early Republic.
understanding of judicial power (sometimes referred to as the declaratory theory of
adjudication) and the doctrine of precedent implicit in it,”184 via voluminous citation
to and selective quotation of a heteroglot selection of “the Framers” and others whose
texts can be yoked to the wheel of his argument linking fidelity to the doctrine of prec-
edent to Article III judicial power.  It concludes that
as the Framers intended, the doctrine of precedent limits the
‘judicial power’ delegated to the courts in Article III.  No less an
authority than Justice (Professor) Joseph Story is in accord:
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled;
but the principles of the decision are held, as precedents
and authority, to bind future cases of the same nature.
This is the constant practice under our whole system of
jurisprudence.  Our ancestors brought it with them, when
they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always
has been considered, as the great security of our rights,
our liberties, and our property.  It is on this account, that
our law is justly deemed certain, and founded in perma-
nent principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or
will of judges.  A more alarming doctrine could not be
promulgated by any American court, than that it was at
liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to
decide for itself, without reference to the settled course
of antecedent principles.
This known course of proceeding, this settled habit of thinking,
this conclusive effect of judicial adjudications, was in the full view
of the framers of the constitution.  It was required, and enforced
in every state in the Union; and a departure from it would have
been justly deemed an approach to tyranny and arbitrary power,
to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of all
the just checks upon judicial authority.185
A close reading of Judge Arnold’s text against its sources establishes that Judge
Arnold’s citations in support of these propositions, and those that follow in his
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186 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
187 Id. at 900 n.6 (citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 323–26 (Penguin Books 1985)
(1651)).
188 See id. at 901–03.
189 Id. at 901 (“The derivation of precedential authority from the law-declaring nature of
the judicial power was also familiar to the Framers through the works of Sir Edward Coke and
Sir Matthew Hale. See 4 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 138 (1642) (a prior judicial
decision on point is sufficient authority on a question of law because ‘a judicial decision is
to the same extent a declaration of the law’); 1 Coke, Institutes 51 (1642) (‘It is the function
of a judge not to make, but to declare the law, according to the golden mete-wand of the law
and not by the crooked cord of discretion.’); Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common
Law of England 44–45 (Univ. of Chicago ed., 1971) (‘Judicial Decisions [have their] Authority
in Expounding, Declaring, and Publishing what the Law of this Kingdom is . . . .’).”).
190 See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1164 n.8, 1166–68 (9th Cir. 2001). These refer-
ences stand in contrast to the modern glosses on which most of his originalist case relies.
191 Kozinski also refers to Coke’s work by way of SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW (1938). See Hart, 266 F.3d at 1164 n.9.
originalist justification for a content to Article III power that would render non-
precedential status rules unconstitutional, are generally problematic.  They are often
quoted out of context; contradictory material is frequently glossed over; and above all,
the opinion quotes selectively from frequently complex and nuanced accounts of
precedent, which themselves can admit of some disagreement with each other.  That
said, given the recency of the development of nonprecedential status rules, it would
be extraordinary if anything in the Framing-era historical record either legitimized it
or unequivocally established their inconsistency with contemporary understandings
of judicial power.
Whatever his fidelity to the historical record, the primary reason Judge Arnold
ascribed to the Framers the “very favorable” view he concluded they had of prece-
dent was that they saw it “as a bulwark of judicial independence” and “the rule of law
against the arbitrary power of government” in “past struggles for liberty.”186  The
only anti-precedent authority in the relevant period, writes Judge Arnold, was Thomas
Hobbes, “who regarded the authority of precedent as an affront to the absolute power
of the Sovereign.”187
The other value of precedent that Judge Arnold draws from his reading of his-
torical sources—English, and Framing-era and post-Framing-era American—is its
restraining of judicial arbitrariness.188  Judge Arnold’s citation to Blackstone on the
relevance of the doctrine of precedent to determining the nature of judicial power
is buttressed by citations to Sir Edward Coke and Sir Matthew Hale framed so as to
underscore the contextually appealing rhetoric of a human judge constrained by a
text,189 the story about judging for which “a government of laws but not of men” is,
in its most literal signification, a metaphor.
Judge Kozinski’s originalist argument from contemporary Framing-era sources,190
such as it is, depends on a literal reading of Hale’s and Mansfield’s191 differentiation
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192 Hart, 266 F.3d at 1169–80.
193 Williams, supra note 76.
194 See Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial Power
to “Unpublish” Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135 (2001) (making a claim for the prag-
matic necessity of the binary system of precedential and nonprecedential opinions).
195 See, e.g., R. Ben Brown, Judging in the Days of the Early Republic: A Critique of
Judge Richard Arnold’s Use of History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 355 (2001); Healy, supra note 14.
196 Williams, supra note 76, at 766.
197 See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, No. XV (Mar. 20, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 437, 440–41 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
198 Prior to the passage of the Seventh Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See SAUL
CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS 31–33 (1999).
between the law as such and the writings that evidence it, rather than reading them
in context.  The remainder of Judge Kozinski’s case on the constitutional question,
drawing on post-Framing sources, depends, first, on casting the doctrine of precedent
as ironclad, allowing for none of the shifts, variations and changes that can characterize
principled judging in a common law system, and, second, on tying it to the bureau-
cratic developments of court hierarchy and parallel U.S. federal jurisdictions.192
Of the four detailed critical studies of Judge Arnold’s originalist argument for a
doctrine of Article III power that does not empower judges to selectively confer pre-
cedential status on classes of opinions, only one193 is not flawed by partisanship,194
or by confusing a general understanding of common law judicial method and practice
with the much more specific national history of development and reception of colo-
nial law and of novel republican forms of law and government.195  This nonpartisan
study concludes that “the historical materials are too opaque and the views of the
Framers regarding the role of precedent in judicial decision-making are too ill-formed
to justify the conclusion that the no-precedent rules are unconstitutional or, conversely,
that they are constitutional.”196  My own reading of Judge Arnold’s sources in the pre-
Framing English era and in America in the Framing era is generally in accord.
However, close reading of the Framing-era sources, both English and American,
cited by Judges Arnold and Kozinski, provides insights into the jurisprudential under-
pinnings of Judge Arnold’s theory of Article III power.  Leaving to one side philo-
sophical debates centered on narrowly Anti-Federalist sentiment and fundamental
opposition to judicial review grounded in the norms of parliamentary democracy,197
Anti-Federalists were concerned about concentration of judicial power in a centralized
court system; the unbridled discretion that might be allowed by granting equity powers
to federal judges in the absence of a settled body of equitable precedent; and misuse
of judicial power in courts only required to use juries as fact-finders in a limited
number of cases.198
More generally, Anti-Federalists were concerned about difficulties in “obtain-
ing . . . justice,” for which “organiz[ation] on the common law principles of the
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199 Letters from The Federal Farmer, No. III (Oct. 10, 1787), in THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 197, at 234, 244.
200 Essays of Brutus, No. XV, supra note 197, at 441.
201 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Sarah E. Cooke ed., 1961).
202 As opposed to legislative precedent, which his Framing-era letter on precedent appears
to address. See Williams, supra note 76, at 818.
203 Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 391
(Marvin Myers ed., 1981).
204 James Wilson, Of the Nature of Courts, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 494,
494–95 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
205 Id. at 495–96.
206 Wilson, Of the Nature of Courts, supra note 204, at 497–98.
207 James Wilson, Of the Constituent Parts of Courts—Of the Judges, in THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON supra note 204, at 500, 502. Wilson’s discussion of Article III is purely de-
scriptive, and, thus, does not necessarily support Williams’s implied argument that Wilson’s
country,” albeit unprovided for in the Constitution itself, might prove a palliative.199
They were also concerned about the building of a secret body of precedent, which
would follow from constitutional disputes between private parties whose decisions
were not effectively made public, thereby increasing federal government power.200
Of influential Federalists, Hamilton thought that a system of precedent would
constrain “arbitrary” judicial “discretion.”201  Madison’s post-Framing-era discourse
on judicial precedent202 proceeded as follows:
[W]hy are judicial precedents, when formed on due discussion
and consideration, and deliberately sanctioned by reviews and rep-
etitions, regarded as of binding influence, or, rather, of authorita-
tive force in settling the meaning of a law? . . .  1st.  Because it
is a reasonable and established axiom, that the good of society
requires that the rules of conduct of its members should be certain
and known, which would not be the case if any judge, disregard-
ing the decision of his predecessors, should vary the rule of law
according to his individual interpretation of it. . . .  2.  Because an
exposition of the law publicly made, and repeatedly confirmed
by the constituted authority, carries with it, by fair inference, the
sanction of those who, having made the law through their leg-
islative organ, appear, under such circumstances, to have deter-
mined its meaning through their judiciary organ.203
James Wilson praised the virtues of open courts;204 court hierarchy as a means of
avoiding inconsistency in legal rules;205 and equal justice as a marker of the rule of
law;206 and advanced a sophisticated account of the claims of precedent on “prudent
and cautious” judges.207
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more general remarks on judicial power have no relevance to the kind of inquiry into influential
Framers’ understanding of judicial power that I am undertaking here. See Williams, supra
note 76, at 818–19; James Wilson, —Of the Judicial Department, in THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON supra note 204, at 446, 454–58.
208 Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81
(2000).
209 See id. at 94–99.
210 See id.
211 Sloan, Government of Laws, supra note 12, at 715 (arguing for the “constitutionality
of a national procedural rule or federal statute prohibiting the federal appellate courts from”
adopting nonprecedential status rules); Sloan, A Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at 901
(proposing using the federal rule-making process to make nonprecedential, or “unpublished”
opinions binding until overruled by a subsequent “published” panel of the issuing court).
212 For detailed studies of the poor quality of unpublished opinions, see William L. Reynolds
& William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of
Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981); William L. Reynolds & William
M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 28 DUKE L.J. 807 (1979).
213 Thus, they argue that “citation prohibitions do indeed interfere with the separation of
powers, not because they deny unpublished case law any precedential value, but because the
courts lack the power under Article III to limit the substance of the non-frivolous arguments
that litigants choose to advance before them.” Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 2, at 315.
Likewise reaching for fundamentals, Polly Price, a former clerk of Judge Arnold
and now Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law, makes a signal con-
tribution to determining whether Article III power authorizes nonprecedential status
rules.208  Her sources suggest that a doctrine of judicial power comprising principled
fidelity to the authority of the common law, symbolized by the doctrine of precedent,
may be understood as critical to the protection of fundamental individual rights, espe-
cially in the absence of entrenched constitutional protection of those rights.209  They
also suggest that judicial power itself is a critical protection of subjects against legis-
lative incursions into fundamental rights.210
b. Narrow Article III Arguments
Most of this work has missed the real constitutional mark, both because it focuses
on separation of powers conundrums that are both incapable of predictive resolution
and largely beside the point in this specific context211 (given the location of the alleg-
edly unconstitutional practice in the judicial branch itself), and because it has failed
to address what is really implied in nonprecedential status rules:  who is really writing
the opinions and “deciding” the appeals, and whether appeals as of right are in fact
being processed as de facto, often poor quality,212 and selectively structurally subor-
dinating certiorari decisions.
Salem Katsh and Alex Chachkes focus on citation bans, not on nonprecedential
status rules, and their constitutionality analysis principally depends on First Amend-
ment grounds.213  Their separation of powers analysis attempts to anatomize a body
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214 Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
215 Id. at 562.
216 Id. Scott Shannon refers to the “nature and limits” of both the general Article III power
and federal courts’ inherent rule-making power as “murky.” Shannon, supra note 14, at 672–73.
217 See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified Judiciary,” 78
TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (2000) (advancing a “tripartite taxonomy of specific judicial power
attributes: intrinsic, hierarchical, and systemic”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers
of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 741–42 (2001)
(proposing two categories of inherent judicial power, “implied indispensable” powers and
“beneficial” powers); Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 480, 485 (1958) (quoting with approval Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., for the
proposition that “those cases that have employed inherent power appear to use that generic
term to describe several distinguishable court powers. To compound this lack of specificity,
courts have relied occasionally on precedents involving one form of power to support the
court’s use of another” (citations omitted)).
218 Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 2, at 317 (emphasis added).
219 This of course raises (situationally insoluble) conundrums about how one might discern
whether the rule was made under delegated Article I power, or inherent Article III power. See
Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory
Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) for a
thoughtful account on limits on Congress’s power to prescribe operating rules for Article III
courts.
220 There is the possibility that a rebel circuit might hold that they retained inherent
Article III rule-making power to maintain a local nonprecedential status rule. Contra Katsh
& Chachkes, supra note 2, at 315–17 (claiming that delegated Article I rule-making power
is “subsumed within the scope of” inherent Article III rule-making power); Jack B. Weinstein,
Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 927–30 (1976)
(characterizing federal courts’ rule-making power as delegated Article I power). The better
of law with “conceptual and definitional problems . . . that have bedeviled commen-
tators for years,”214 where there is little federal law, and where that which exists has
used the “generic term [inherent powers] to describe several distinguishable court
powers,”215 and which additionally has “relied occasionally on precedents involving
one form of power to support the . . . use of another.”216  While other scholars have
characterized them differently,217 Katsh and Chachkes’s tripartite model for inherent
federal judicial power is useful for determining whether nonprecedential status rules
are ultra vires Article III.
The first type, which the leading separation of Article III power cases involve,
“protect[s] from legislative encroachment judicial activities deemed indefeasibly
vested in the judicial branch.”218  It might be invoked if the federal legislature passed
a statute outside of the normal federal rule-making process, banning nonprecedential
status rules, or if the subject matter of a federal rule banning local nonprecedential
status rules was challenged as exceeding legislative power.219  As a practical matter,
however, the process of developing such a federal rule would make such a holding
unlikely, given the involvement of the Federal Judicial Conference in crafting and the
Supreme Court in approving such rules, formally embodied in federal legislation.220
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view seems to be that inherent Article III rule-making power is separate from—albeit sup-
plementary of—delegated Article I rule-making power. See A. Leo Levin & Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1958) (giving a history of the development of concurrent
legislative and judicial rule-making power in the U.S., and noting that “the outer boundaries
of this sphere of total judicial autonomy have been difficult to locate with precision”).
221 See infra Part III.A.
222 Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 2, at 318 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see
also Pushaw, supra note 217, at 742 (discussing the implied authority of federal courts granted
by the Constitution).
223 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3. Katsh and Chachkes make an analogous suggestion in relation to
circuits that did not have citation bans prior to FRAP 32.1. See Katsh & Chachkes, supra
note 2, at 320–21.
224 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001).
225 Id. at 1176.
As to legislation banning nonprecedential status rules, it seems likely that such legis-
lation, bypassing the federal rule-making process, would both indicate the presence
of and be met with judicial opposition, and, thus, whatever the formal constitutional
analysis might suggest, the likelihood is high that the courts would find such a statute
breached the separation of powers.  As the discussion of the inherent judicial power
cases in Part III.A suggests, where the Court has approved of jurisdiction stripping,
this has accorded with the self-interest of the federal bench, for example in being
“protected” from the burden of prison conditions litigation; where the Court has re-
sisted it and struck down legislation, such legislation has also been subject specific,
rather than affecting a broad general aspect of how the courts do business.221
The second type of judicial power, distinct from formal rule-making power and
not deployed defensively against legislative incursions into judicial prerogatives
justif[ies] actions essential to the administration of justice or
functioning of the judiciary. . . .  Courts have frequently relied
on this second species of inherent power to impose contempt sanc-
tions, to “act sua sponte to dismiss a suit . . . and enter [a] default
judgment” for failure to prosecute a case, or, less frequently, “to
file restrictive pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants.”222
Are nonprecedential status rules and the practices justified and enabled by them
“essential”?  The rules themselves may not be, given the Fifth Circuit’s ability to
function without one in relation to unpublished opinions issued before January 1,
1996.223  However, given the rationales for nonprecedential status rules, which range
from allocating resources to published opinions in order to “develop[ ] a coherent
and internally consistent body of caselaw to serve as binding authority for themselves
and the courts below them”224 and avoid creating “spurious bas[es] for distinguishing
the case in the future,”225 to avoiding wasting judicial time on matters characterized
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226 Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (stating that “the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts
can be limited by statute and rule, for ‘[t]hese courts were created by act of Congress’” (quoting
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1874))); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (“[I]t is well established that ‘[e]ven a sensible and efficient
use of the supervisory power . . . is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory
provisions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985))).
While the position about constitutional conflicts is clear, there are differences of view about
the extent to which inherent Article III rule-making power, although clearly subject to limits
where it conflicts with a constitutional guarantee, is itself subject to federal legislative or regu-
latory control. In Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924), the Court wrote of
“limits not precisely defined” to Congress’s power to regulate courts. Pushaw claims that
where it is “essential” rather than merely “useful” judicial rule-making power is not subject
to federal legislative or regulatory control
[b]ecause the Constitution itself gives federal courts implied authority that is
essential to their independent exercise of judicial power, Articles I and III cannot
reasonably be interpreted as allowing Congress to negate this grant by eliminat-
ing or materially abridging such authority. Rather, the Constitution allows only
legislation that facilitates the courts’ exercise of their implied indispensable powers
or that reasonably regulates minor details of such powers. For example, Article I’s
vesting in Congress of “legislative power” (i.e., to make prospective rules of
general applicability) over judicial matters should be read as incorporating the
English understanding that statutes could not thwart the courts’ ability to function.
Likewise, the Necessary and Proper Clause should be construed as authorizing
Congress to enact appropriate laws regarding essential inherent powers that help
federal courts “carry into execution” (in other words, effectuate) their express
Article III duties.
Pushaw, supra note 217, at 742. William F. Ryan, Rush To Judgment: A Constitutional
Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 778–79 (1997), claims
that exercises of power in the first category may be “control[led]” and those in the second cate-
gory “completely abrogate[d]” by the legislature. But see David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits
of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 104–06 (theorizing
a very narrow legislative power to regulate the courts, based in a revisionist reading of the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
227 See Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 2, at 318.
as not deserving of appellate judicial energy, it is entirely possible that appellate courts
might consider the practices justified and enabled by nonprecedential status rules,
like the rules themselves, “essential.”
However, there is authority for the proposition that neither “essential” rules
nor practices would stand if they were held to “circumvent or conflict with” the
Constitution, federal legislation, or federal rules.226  I will argue in Part III.B that
close critical reading of the authority on what is “essential to the administration of
justice” may provide a basis for establishing that nonprecedential status rules cir-
cumvent or conflict with the Constitution, at least on the basis of a broad normative
reading of what is traceable to other Bill of Rights provisions.
The third type of inherent judicial power from Katsh and Chachkes’s tripartite
model is formal “practice and procedure” rule-making power.227  Such rule making can
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228 Article I power to make court rules derives from the Tribunals Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941);
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825).
229 Scott Shannon, by contrast, suggests that formal rules are beyond Article III power,
which can only be exercised “through the adjudication of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”
Shannon, supra note 14, at 681–84.
230 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
231 Id. § 2072(b).
232 Providing, inter alia, that “all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to
time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business,” and that such rules “shall be consistent
with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072.”
Id. § 2071(a).
233 FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1).
234 Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163 n.22 (1973).
235 Shannon argues that rules that exceed delegated Article I power are not “strictly” un-
constitutional. Shannon, supra note 14, at 661. The difficulty in discerning whether a local
rule is made under delegated Article I or inherent Article III power limits the utility of this
argument. Some commentators have argued that there are areas of concurrent Article I and
Article III power to prescribe how federal courts conduct business. See, e.g., Linda J. Rusch,
Separation of Powers Analysis as a Method for Determining the Validity of Federal District
Courts’ Exercise of Local Rulemaking Power: Application to Local Rules Mandating Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 487–90 (1991); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform
of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 906 (1976).
236 See, e.g., Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 151–60 (holding that a local rule for six-person juries
was consistent with the Seventh Amendment).
legitimately be made in the exercise of delegated legislative power under Article I,228
or in the exercise of inherent judicial rule-making power under Article III.229  Dele-
gated Article I national federal appellate court rules are limited to “general rules
of practice and procedure” consistent with federal statutes,230 and not “abridg[ing],
enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] any substantive right.”231  Local delegated Article I federal
appellate court rules are made both pursuant to FRAP 47, itself authorized by 28
U.S.C. § 2072, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2071.232  FRAP 47 enables each circuit
court to “make and amend rules governing its practice” that are “consistent with—not
duplicative of—Acts of Congress” and national rules.233  Section 2071 requires that
local rules be “for the conduct of [the court’s] business” and consistent with federal
statutes, including 28 U.S.C. § 2072,234 and rules.
Thus, in order to be constitutional, local nonprecedential status rules must first
either be within the inherent Article III power of federal courts, on the one hand; or,
if not within inherent Article III power, not exceed Congress’s delegated Article I
power to make rules for federal courts.235  Second, in any event, in the case of both
Article I and Article III procedural rule-making power, such rules must not abridge
a constitutional right,236 nor otherwise fall foul of the Constitution.  As with exercises
of the courts’ essential rule-making power, there is authority for the proposition that
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237 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
238 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 1981) (“Court rules
generally address court procedures and court conduct of business. Congress has authorized
the courts to ‘prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.’ [FRAP 47], adopted under that
authority, authorizes the judges of the circuit to make rules of practice not inconsistent with
FRAP, and in cases not provided for by FRAP authorizes the court of appeals ‘to regulate
their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.’ Neither the statute nor FRAP
addresses the establishment of substantive law by court rule. The judges of this court, when
judges of the former Fifth Circuit, maintained a distinct separation between their administrative
and their judicial functions. The substantive law of the circuit was established by the exercise
of judicial authority and procedural rules by administrative action. We consider it inappro-
priate to decide what this circuit’s substantive law will be by any means other than judicial
decision.”). While national and local rules made under delegated Article I power may inci-
dentally affect substantive rights, as shown in Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
445–46 (1946), if they do so they must be “reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of
[the court’s] system of rules.” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
239 See Shannon, supra note 14, at 666–71 (discussing subconstitutional limitations on
making a rule abrogating stare decisis and using as an example the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption
of Fifth Circuit precedent in Bonner, 661 F.2d 1206); see also Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking
“Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47
(1998) (proposing a multi-factor test for a contextual analysis of the “practice and procedure”
and “substantive right” binary).
240 Schiltz, Much Ado, supra note 34, at 1484 n.273. But see John Harrison, The Power of
Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 504, 506–30 (2000) (arguing that
Congress could validly “legislate [a] rule of stare decisis,” provided that such a rule is one
“that a court reasonably could recognize” because rules of precedent are federal common law
not constitutional law); accord Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute:
May Congress Remove the Precedential Effects of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535
(2000) (arguing for the constitutionality of a statute abrogating stare decisis in constitutional
cases); see also Engdahl, supra note 226 (arguing for the constitutional infirmity of the Rules
Enabling Act as exceeding congressional power); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and
the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001)
(arguing for the “constitutional status of stare decisis”); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent:
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 194 (2001)
(arguing that “Congress may not by statute tell the federal courts whether or in what way to
use precedent”); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power:
A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 272 (1993) (arguing
its Article III procedural rule-making power cannot conflict with federal statutes
or rules, and this case is arguably rather stronger for merely “procedural” than for
“essential” exercises of inherent power.237
Additionally, local court rules made under delegated Article I power cannot
make “substantive” law,238 which must be made by decisions in cases and contro-
versies.239  Patrick Schiltz, formerly the Reporter for the Appellate Rules Committee
and now a federal judge, has expressed the view that a “rule that prescribed the legal
force that must be accorded unpublished opinions would likely ‘abridge, enlarge or
modify’ the ‘substantive right[s]’ of the parties.”240  Such rights likely extend beyond
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that Congress’s powers to make law are limited to matters “peculiarly within the jurisdiction
or competence of Congress—that is, to be laws that do not tread on the retained rights of indi-
viduals or states, or the prerogatives of federal executive or judicial departments”); Martin
H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46
MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995) (identifying limits to Congress’s power to prescribe court rules
where such rules affect how cases are decided).
241 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), the seminal case defining “pro-
cedure” in 28 U.S.C. § 2072 as “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recog-
nized by substantive law.” See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982) (detailing the origins of the Rules Enabling Act); Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and
“Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 287 (arguing that “procedure”
and “substance” are not mutually exclusive); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie,
87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974) (arguing that a correct reading of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), would give state rules greater weight); Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of
Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 397 (1976) (discussing the effect
of procedural rules on jurisdictional tests); Shannon, supra note 14, at 665–66 (discussing
the non-procedural nature of rules defining weight of authority in the context of rules abro-
gating stare decisis, although his analysis applies equally to a rule- altering principles of stare
decisis. He adds that such a rule also is not procedural in nature because it would not primarily
be directed toward acts necessary to enforce rights and duties, or in other words, conduct neces-
sary to resolve a case); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004)
(stressing the importance of using procedural rules to increase participation and legitimacy);
1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 1.05[2][b], at 1–29 (3d ed. 2008).
242 See Shannon, supra note 14, at 666–71.
243 Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 2, at 318 (quoting ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569
F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978)).
244 Id. 319.
245 There is also authority suggesting two other limitations on local rule-making power. The
first suggests that the Supreme Court has the “inherent supervisory power” to strike down
constitutionally guaranteed “rights.”241  There is, additionally, some primary authority
suggesting that rule making about the precedential value of opinions does not fall
within the ambit of “procedural” rule making.242
Following from the limitation of rule making about matters of substance, even non-
precedential status rules made by federal courts pursuant to their inherent Article III
power would arguably be ultra vires.  Inherent Article III rule-making power is said
to derive from “the notion that a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the
common law equity tools of a chancery court (subject, of course, to congressional
limitation) to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion.”243  There is some
authority for the proposition that such “court rules . . . [must be] consistent with the
policies of 28 U.S.C. § 2071—that is, those that prescribe the conduct of court
business . . . [and] are subservient to the supremacy of statutory or constitutional
dictates.”244  Thus, local procedural rules made under Article III power cannot be in-
consistent with a national federal rule or statute, such as 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)’s pro-
scription against “abridg[ing], enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] any substantive right.”245
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local rules in order “to protect the integrity of the federal system,” where such local rules are
“[in]consistent with principles of right and justice.” Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987);
see also James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise
Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1452–54 (2000). The second limitation authorizes
the Supreme Court to strike down local rules that constitute impermissible “basic procedural
innovations,” Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960), at least where those procedural inno-
vations involve “those aspects of the litigatory process which bear upon the ultimate outcome
of the litigation,” Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 164 n.23 (1973).
246 Fallon, supra note 240, at 577–78.
247 Id. at 592–93.
248 Id. at 581.
249 Id. at 596 n.115.
250 Id. at 573.
251 Id. at 586.
252 Id. at 589.
c. Inherent Article III and Constitutionality of Precedent Scholarship
The considerable literature debating the constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s
specifically constitutional precedent is generally peripheral to considering whether
the adoption of nonprecedential status rules and the practices justified and enabled
by them lies within Article III power.  However, Richard Fallon, arguing that lengthy
post-Framing practice can “constitutionalize” stare decisis, reasons that “Article III’s
grant of ‘the judicial Power’ authorizes the Supreme Court to elaborate and rely on a
principle of stare decisis and, more generally, to treat precedent as a constituent ele-
ment of constitutional adjudication,” and thus, as itself constitutional.246  He concludes
that “[t]o recognize a congressional power to determine the weight to be accorded
to precedent . . . would infringe [the] core judicial function” of the Supreme Court:
deciding what the Constitution means and how it applies in a constitutional case.247
While Fallon argues in passing that there “is no structural anomaly in the view
that judicial precedents also enjoy limited constitutional authority in the [lower
federal] courts that rendered them,”248 his footnoted conclusion about the Anastasoff
doctrine is dismissive:  “Unlike a total elimination of stare decisis effect, the special
treatment of unpublished opinions does not threaten the overall fabric of constitutional
doctrine by putting everything at issue at once;”249 that is, by obliging the Court “to
reconsider every potentially disputable [constitutional] issue as if it were being raised
for the first time.”250  This conclusion skirts his core reasoning for the constitutionality
of (at least constitutional) precedent:  a hybrid “moral” and positivist standard for con-
stitutionalizing practices that meet the standard of judicial legitimacy, which in turn
requires that those practices “accord[ ] with the positive law of a legal system that is
reasonably just,”251 and which in turn attracts “acceptance” by the governed.252
“Reasonable justice” likely requires the similar treatment of similarly situated
litigants.  Thus, especially given that the Fifth Circuit copes without a nonprecedential
status rule as to its earlier precedents, while the range of more or less reasonable—
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254 Jones, Back to the Future, supra note 74 (discussing THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING
JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994)).
255 Fallon, supra note 240, at 596 n.115. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman,
Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1290, 1291 (1996), for an account
of the circumstantial evidence that judicial outcomes are affected by limited consideration
of cases on appeal.
256 See, e.g., Robel, Myth of the Disposable Opinion, supra note 6, at 955–58 (arguing that
unpublished opinions shift substantive outcomes in favor of frequent litigants).
257 Fallon, supra note 240, at 596 n.115.
that is, formally legitimate—claims for the rules’ practical necessity may trump their
costs to justice, the actual reasons for the rules are less likely to do so.
Further, as to the practices justified and enabled by nonprecedential status rules,
given the general judicial reticence to admit of them publicly, it seems unlikely that the
litigants who file appeals in large and increasing numbers do so with the understanding
that their appeals may be decided by someone other than a judge, or that the level of
scrutiny they receive may not include the decision maker reading such critical docu-
ments as the appellate record,253 or that appeals are processed in a culture that believes
that they and their subjects “dumb down” the jurisprudential environment of the fed-
eral courts of appeals.254  Thus, the justice or legitimacy that would ground the “assent
of the governed” to the practices justified and enabled by the rules is lacking.
Similarly, Fallon’s assertion that “unlike a denial of precedential effect to opinions
addressing particular subjects (or resolving particular issues in a particular way), the
rule challenged in Anastasoff was not an attempt to manipulate or alter substantive
outcomes and was unlikely to have any systematic effect in doing so”255 exists in a
degree of tension with the evidence of structurally subordinating effects of non-
precedential status rules.  There is, additionally, evidence that it provides cover for
manipulating outcomes in a range of differing ways.256
Finally, Fallon’s assertion that “the rule involved in Anastasoff did not constitute
an assault on the traditional, entrenched core of stare decisis—it involved a judicially,
rather than congressionally, mandated adjustment at the doctrine’s fringes,”257 while
clearly rooted in his position on the separation of powers and his engagement with
Michael Stokes Paulsen’s crusade against constitutional precedent, misses both my
point and his own.  In an adjudicatory system where constitutional judging is diffuse
rather than concentrated, and, thus, one where examining incursions by government
into individual constitutional rights is generally done outside the Supreme Court, it
makes little sense to suggest that an incident of Article III power applies to its full
extent only when the Supreme Court decides a “constitutional” question.  This is espe-
cially the case in context:  the vast majority of federal appellate decisions are non-
precedential.  And either stare decisis has a normative basis, as Fallon asserts in
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260 Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 357, 361.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 398.
264 Id. at 361.
265 Id. at 431. The reference is to James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). See Symposium,
One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 1 (1993), for a comprehensive treatment of Thayer’s essay.
266 Id. at 432.
making his argument for the constitutionality of constitutional precedent, or it does
not; given that it does, it makes little difference beyond the narrow context of ideolog-
ical turf wars over the balance of powers between the elected and appointed branches
of government, which branch is eroding it.
While Fallon’s argument for the constitutionality of stare decisis depends on its
“deep roots in historical and contemporary practice,”258 precisely that historical root-
edness might militate in favor of questioning the constitutionality of a mandate that
departs as radically from it as nonprecedential status rules arguably do and that are as
identifiably neologistic.  Nonetheless, Fallon’s criticism gestures towards the practical
difficulties in crafting a doctrine of Article III power that is equal to addressing the
constitutional infirmities in the regime of nonprecedential status rules and the practices
justified and enabled by them:  “arguments that deeply entrenched practices violate
the Constitution seldom succeed,”259 a fortiori when the judiciary are policing them-
selves rather than another branch of government.
A proposal for an Article III power doctrine of some practical serviceability in
crafting a thick doctrine of Article III power and duty is Adrian Vermeule’s argument
for a “non-justiciability” doctrine,260 which would require judges to “declare nonjus-
ticiable any claim that legislation intrudes upon the freestanding grant of the ‘judicial
power.’”261  The proposed doctrine has two exceptions:  “claims that legislation
either violates specific constitutional provisions governing judicial authority, such
as a clause protecting judicial salaries from reduction,”262 or claims that legislation
circumscribes constitutionally protected individual liberties with a special connection
to the judicial process “such as the right to jury trial.”263
This “thin” inherent Article III power doctrine is premised on “safeguard[ing]
legislative authority from the predictable and insistent cognitive pressures that cause
judges to press judicial prerogatives to implausible extremes,”264 and a taste for a
hybrid of “Thayerian restraint,”265 and formalist constitutional hermeneutics, which
together value the overprotection of the authority of the “political branches.”266  The
institutionalized failure of judicial ethics evidenced and constituted by the federal
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269 See infra Part III.C.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 208–10.
courts of appeals’ half century and more of structurally subordinating jurisdiction
stripping, whether proceeding from selective complicity with initiatives at least for-
mally proceeding from other branches of government, or originating in the material
practices of the courts themselves, resonates with Vermeule’s concern for judicial
overreaching in the service of judicial branch self-interest, and contrary to (whatever
one takes to be) fundamental constitutional values.
Vermeule situates his doctrinal proposal in the context of judicial review of
“legislative encroachment on judicial prerogative.”267  My estimation is that genuine
legislative encroachment268 on nonprecedential status rules is unlikely, that the courts’
own self-interest is likely to lead them to strike down any such legislative intervention,
and that the prospects for Judicial Conference-based reforms are presently poor.  The
scope of any such doctrine’s application to nonprecedential status rules and the prac-
tices they justify and enable is thus limited.  Nonetheless, as discussed later in this
Article, Vermeule’s nonjusticiability doctrine provides some productive orientation
towards a thick doctrine of Article III power.269  So too does the constitutionalist core
of Judge Arnold’s reasoning in Anastasoff, and its historical sources, as does the impor-
tance of the doctrine of precedent for protecting individual rights emerging from the
early “vested property” cases.270  Additionally, as previously indicated in Part II.A.2.b,
an analysis of the formal rule-making power of federal courts suggests that it does
not authorize nonprecedential status rules.
B. Why Existing Models for the Ultra Vires Analysis Are Inadequate
The most telling deficiency in the scholarship on nonprecedential status rules,
authorizing courts to treat similarly situated litigants differently, is that no matter how
troubling such a departure from mainstream understandings of common law method
might be, the practices they justify and enable are more troubling still.  Thus, any
account of the constitutional status of nonprecedential status rules that fails to address
those practices they justify and enable—delegating Article III power, enabling a shoddy
certiorari system to function under cover of the promise of genuine appeals as of right,
and systematically producing structural subordination—is inadequate.
Once Article III must be read through other constitutional provisions, leaving
aside the problem that none of the equal protection, due process, or First Amend-
ment analyses advanced to date are soundly and comprehensively jurisprudentially
grounded, one is faced with the problems that beset the due process and equal pro-
tection arguments for the unconstitutionality of nonprecedential status rules discussed
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549 (1941) (holding that “the state and its officers may not abridge or impair . . . [the] right to
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277 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822.
in Part II.A.1, as well as the broader factual, procedural, or strategic barriers to bring-
ing constitutional challenges to the rules themselves and the practices they justify and
enable.  Chief among these are basic questions of standing; the difficulty in persuad-
ing federal courts, up to and including the Supreme Court, to rule that what has be-
come business as usual is unconstitutional;271 and the fact that proving, for example,
who actually decided one’s appeal, and how he decided it, would in most cases be
well-nigh impossible.
C. And What of the Unexplored (Doctrinal) Alternatives?
There are, however, two possible doctrinal bases for constitutional infirmity of
nonprecedential status rules that existing scholarship on the constitutionality of aspects
of institutionalized unpublication has not addressed:  access to courts and nondele-
gation doctrine.272
1. Article III and Fundamental Interests:  The Right of Access to Courts
Bounds v. Smith marked the high-water mark of the jurisprudence developing the
most salient constitutional right that might, considered in combination with Article III,
bear on the constitutionality of nonprecedential status rules and their underlying
practices, at least in relation to criminal cases.273  In Bounds, the Court announced it
“beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts,”274
a principle said to owe its origins275 to Griffin v. Illinois.276  The constitutional standard
for access to the courts is that it is “adequate, effective, and meaningful.”277
Announcing in Griffin a right to trial transcripts for indigent defendants in state
criminal appeals, the Court’s plurality, drawing on both “due process and equal
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protection,”278 held that just as criminal trial procedures “which allow no invidious
discriminations” based on poverty are constitutionally mandated, so there “is no mean-
ingful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend them-
selves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate
review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance.”279  Dis-
senting, Justice Harlan inaugurated his framing of the right of court access in due
process alone,280 sounding in considerations of “fundamental fairness.”281  The right
of access to the courts articulated by Justice Harlan was “simply the right not to be
denied an appeal for arbitrary or capricious reasons.”282
Subsequently, in Douglas v. California, the right of court access was held to
mandate state-appointed counsel for indigent defendants for an initial appeal as of
(statutory) right from a conviction.283  Once again, and in dissent, pressing a pure due
process framework for the right of court access, Justice Harlan used the formula of
contextual arbitrariness or unreasonableness to characterize the kinds of rules that
might infringe on the right of court access.284  While Ross v. Moffitt refused to extend
the right of access to mandate the provision of state-appointed counsel on a discre-
tionary appeal from a criminal conviction, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the court
held that what was required was “an adequate opportunity to present . . . claims fairly
in the context” of the relevant appellate process.285  The Ross Court reasoned that
because error correction is not the primary function of subsequent discretionary
appeals,286 and because an appellant at that stage would have a record of the trial
proceedings, an appellate brief from the first appeal as of right, and often an opinion
on the first appeal, the Douglas reasoning did not apply.287
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290 Id. at 611, 617.
291 Id. at 617.
292 Id. at 611, 617–18.
293 Id. at 610.
294 Id.
295 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
296 Id. at 610–11 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996)).
297 Id. at 619 (citation omitted).
In 2005, the Court returned to the “right of access” doctrine in criminal cases
in Halbert v. Michigan,288 holding that because these appeals were direct,289 and
on the merits;290 because indigent defendants pursuing them were “generally ill
equipped to represent themselves;”291 and because such appeals were conducted as
error-correcting appeals;292 the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses required
that prisoners convicted on pleas of guilty or no contest be provided with appointed
counsel in initial discretionary appeals.293
Noting that there is no federal constitutional right to appellate review of criminal
convictions,294 the Court reasoned that where appellate review is provided by a state
government, it “may not ‘bolt the door to equal justice’ to indigent defendants,”295 and
that “‘[t]he equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out would-
be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs,’ while ‘[t]he due process
concern homes in on the essential fairness of the . . . proceedings.’”296  The Court
drew attention to the Ross Court’s emphasis on the following:
[A] defendant seeking State Supreme Court review following a
first-tier appeal as of right earlier had the assistance of appellate
counsel.  The attorney appointed to serve at the intermediate
appellate court level will have reviewed the trial court record,
researched the legal issues, and prepared a brief reflecting that
review and research.  The defendant seeking second-tier review
may also be armed with an opinion of the intermediate appellate
court addressing the issues counsel raised.  A first-tier review
applicant, forced to act pro se, will face a record unreviewed by
appellate counsel, and will be equipped with no attorney’s brief
prepared for, or reasoned opinion by, a court of review.297
The criminal right of access cases do not directly address adjudication by an
Article III actor in the federal appellate courts.  Nonetheless, they require facilities
likely to result in fair procedures and error correction:  the provision of appointed
counsel on initial appeals as of right and other direct error-correcting appeals on the
merits; the provision of transcripts and other aids in preparing cases, including those
1004 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 17:955
298 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996).
299 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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302 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 365 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
303 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
304 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
305 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
306 Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
seeking collateral review of convictions and § 1983 civil rights violations; and sub-
sequent appeals and collateral and civil rights proceedings constitutionally require
“less process” than initial direct appeals.  Further, the federal courts have embraced
appellate jurisdiction stripping in habeas298 and prisoner civil rights299 cases.
All that being said, even in the face of evidence of the ability of some on the
federal appellate bench to rationalize differentially “rationed justice”300 on overt
efficiency grounds, procedures that tend to provide differential access to statutorily
granted appellate review to the economically disadvantaged might infringe against
Justice Rehnquist’s modest account of what equal protection in the fundamental
right of access to courts context constitutionally requires:  “an adequate opportunity
to present . . . claims fairly”301 in context, especially when the function of such appeals
is error correction.  Likewise, and again underscored by the statutory conferring of
appeal rights, denial of genuine appellate review by an Article III actor arguably crosses
the threshold of Justice Harlan’s requirement of procedural fairness, as “arbitrary or un-
reasonable, in the context of the particular appellate procedure . . . established.”302
Nonetheless, not only is the practical political likelihood of a federal court of
appeals or the Supreme Court finding the practices that are justified and enabled by
nonprecedential status rules unconstitutional extremely slim, but establishing the evi-
dentiary basis for a claim of denial of court access based on decision making by non-
Article III actors—or lack of meaningful review, let alone one based on systematically
biased decision making—also seems to face insurmountable barriers.  Further, given
the narrowness and limited scope of the existing doctrine on the rights of access in
civil cases—holding filing fees for divorce applications303 and for appeals against
orders terminating parental rights304 unconstitutional, but fees for voluntary bank-
ruptcy applications305 and applications for judicial review of administrative denial of
welfare benefits306 constitutional—we are confronted once again, as with due process
analysis, with a range of doctrinal frameworks for constitutional analysis of what
appellate process is needed to provide appellants a fundamental right of access to the
federal courts of appeals.
Additionally, some of the procedural hurdles that face challenges to constitution-
ality, based on a combination of Article III and another Bill of Rights provision men-
tioned above, also apply when Article III is read through the right of access.  Chief
among these is standing.  The challenge to constitutionality of the rule or practice
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307 Smith v. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 484 F.3d 1281, 1286–87 (10th Cir. 2007),
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308 Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000).
309 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61 (1992) (citations omitted).
310 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904–05 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot en
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362–403 (5th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2008) for the standard account of this doctrine.
312 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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must arise in the context of litigation before the court:  “a circuit non-publication rule
may be challenged in the circuit court when application of the rule in a live proceed-
ing before that court directly implicates the interest of a party or counsel in that pro-
ceeding.”307  And the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III jurisdiction
requires a “case . . . not [an] issu[e]”:308
[This standing requirement] contains three elements.  First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely
“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable
decision.”309
Satisfying the “case or controversy” requirement would only appear to be readily
achievable where a court frankly relied on its nonprecedential status rule in refusing to
follow an earlier decision in relation to a similarly situated litigant.  But as Anastasoff
itself suggests,310 a court can reason that matters other than the mere existence of the
rule mandated such an outcome.
2. Nondelegation Doctrine
While detailed analysis of this body of law and the contours of Article III power
that it establishes is beyond the scope of this Article,311 one group of leading inherent
Article III power cases, Crowell v. Benson,312 Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,313 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
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314 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
315 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
316 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
317 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
318 Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters, 2 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 235, 289 (1997); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46, 47, 49, 51 (1932); id.
at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“If there be any controversy to which the judicial power extends
that may not be subjected to the conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal
legislative courts, it is not because of any prohibition against the diminution of the jurisdiction
of the federal district courts as such, but because, under certain circumstances, the constitutional
requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process.”).
319 See supra notes 303–10 and accompanying text.
320 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 937 (1988).
321 Id. at 938.
Co.,314 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,315 and Granfinanciara v.
Nordberg,316 together with the leading case on delegating Article III power to magis-
trate judges, United States v. Raddatz,317 addresses an issue of particular relevance
to one of the practices justified and enabled by nonprecedential status rules:  delega-
tion of primary Article III decision making to non-Article III actors.  The constitu-
tionality of such delegation is governed both by Article III itself and, at least in some
circumstances, by the Due Process Clauses.318
Because these cases concern delegation of primary decision making rather than
of appellate review, and transparent delegation of Article III decision-making power
to a body other than an Article III court rather than intra-court delegation to adjuncts,
they are of limited direct use in evaluating the constitutionality of delegation of federal
appellate decision making to staff.  Nonetheless, in part because the hierarchy of
constitutionally authorized delegation of Article III power that these cases establish
is similar to that which the courts’ internal operating procedures apply to intra-court
delegation to non-Article III actors, close reading of the decisions is instructive in
determining the varying constitutional values the Court has found to be at stake in the
delegating of federal judging.  The differing contours of the Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on what is and is not a constitutionally permissible delegation likewise suggest
the real constitutional stakes entailed in both nonprecedential status rules and the
adjudicatory practices that underpin them.  This is particularly the case where they
mandate judicial review by an Article III court as a condition of constitutionality of
delegated adjudication.  These cases also suggest what safeguards might be put in place
to minimize decisional infirmity, should intra-court delegation to non-Article III actors
persist, as I have suggested is more likely than not.319
Richard Fallon identifies the constitutional values advanced by constitutional
limitations on delegating Article III power as those safeguarded by the separation
of judicial power,320 and rule of law values,321 specifying that “there are at least three
Article III values at stake in cases such as Crowell”:
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322 FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 369.
323 Farrell, supra note 318, at 290.
324 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 367 (“[T]he strains that acceptance of adminis-
trative adjudication puts on efforts to develop a coherent theory of the necessary role of courts
under Article III, the separation of powers, and the Due Process Clause.”).
325 Fallon, supra note 320, at 935.
326 Id. at 936, 937.
327 Id. at 936.
328 Id.
329 FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 370.
330 See Fallon, supra note 320, at 923; Farrell, supra note 318, at 290–91. See also Fallon,
supra note 320, at 921–26, 928 for a discussion of differences between the doctrine in
(I) ensuring fair adjudication to individual litigants, (ii) main-
taining a system of judicial review and judicial remedies that
suffices to keep government generally within the bounds of law,
and (iii) preserving judicial integrity by not requiring a court to
accept an agency’s erroneous decision as conclusive of a legal
issue and to make that decision a predicate for the judicial impo-
sition of civil or criminal penalties.322
Another scholar emphasizes the commitment to values, including those reflected
in the Bill of Rights and procedural fairness more generally; judicial independence
per se; and the absence of bias and neutrality supposedly achieved through adju-
dication by judicial officers with the independence thought to be guaranteed by life
appointments and constitutional salary protections.323
These values exist in considerable tension324 with those that have led both to the
proliferation of Article I tribunals and administrative adjudication, and to the Court’s
authorization of such adjudicatory bodies and ratification of the delegation of Article III
power to them.  They include:  the desirability of delegating administrative decision
making to bodies with regulatory and subject matter expertise; Congress’s interest in
the flexibility to “implement a substantive regulatory agenda;” maintaining “reason-
able efficiency and order in . . . the traditional domain of public rights cases . . . tax,
welfare, customs and immigration;”325 limiting litigation costs to government and
citizens;326 the political and practical flexibility entailed in assembling an adjudica-
tory workforce without life tenure to prevent burdening judges;327 and the possible
enhancement of the quality and fairness of decision making emerging from agencies
with subject matter specialization.328
The delegational subset of Article III power cases shows a split in the constitu-
tional doctrine on the requirement of review of adjudicatory decisions by Article III
courts applicable to private and public rights disputes, respectively.  While the con-
tours of what a public right is and is not is rooted in history rather than being amenable
to ready definition,329 judicial review by an Article III court of delegated adjudica-
tion is not required330 in disputes between individuals and the government that are
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disputes, and drawing attention to the indeterminate contours of the class of private rights
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the scope of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, the presumption is in favor of Art. III courts.”);
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331 FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 378–79.
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333 Id. at 65.
334 Id. at 66.
335 Id. at 67–69. The seminal case on the public rights doctrine is Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
336 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929); FALLON ET AL., supra note 311,
at 379.
337 FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 370.
338 Id. But see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001) (concluding that “some ‘judicial
intervention in deportation cases’ is unquestionably ‘required by the Constitution’” (quoting
Hekkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953))).
339 See, e.g., N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67–70, 77; Fallon, supra note 320, at 914 & n.56;
Farrell, supra note 318, at 291; see also Granfinanciara, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 50–55
(1989) (holding that while Congress cannot constitutionally strip parties disputing matters of
private rights, as opposed to public rights, of their right to trial by jury, and while an appar-
ently private right “closely intertwined” with a federal regulatory program that Congress has
power to enact is characterizable as “public,” the recovery of the object of a fraudulent con-
veyance is properly a private right, and thus, the Seventh Amendment entitled the party sued
by the bankruptcy trustee a jury trial). The holding was limited. The Court did not rule on the
question of the constitutionality (on either Article III or Seventh Amendment grounds) of
having jury trials in bankruptcy courts overseen by bankruptcy judges with provision for
review by Article III courts, rather than in an Article III court and overseen by an Article III
judge. Id. at 50; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
adjudicated by specialized Article I courts, such as the federal Tax Court, the Court
of Veteran’s Appeals, and the Court of Claims;331 decisions of territorial courts,332
courts in the District of Columbia,333 and military Courts;334 and those that involve
determination of “public rights” by administrative agencies.335  They largely involve
civil suits against the federal government for “money, land, or other things;”336 and also
include “[d]isputes arising from coercive governmental conduct outside the criminal
law;”337 and immigration law.338  By contrast, when the adjudication of private rights
is carried out by a non-Article III decision maker, judicial review by an Article III
court is constitutionally mandated.339
Crowell v. Benson, notoriously a case which in its time was significant in limit-
ing delegation of Article III power, but which history has judged as authorizing the
vesting of large and increasing extents of adjudicatory authority in the organs of the
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the rise of administrative adjudication and Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), cast considerable doubt. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 372–73.
342 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46, 49.
343 Id. at 54, 56, 61, 62.
344 See id. at 61; Farrell, supra note 318, at 292 (characterizing Crowell as holding that
“delegations of essential fact finding authority to . . . adjuncts was permitted only if Article III
federal judges exercised ‘close supervision,’ and the adjunct had no independent authority to
enforce its own orders”).
345 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 61–63. See Farrell, supra note 318, at 292 & n.234, 294–95, for
an account of the effects of the Administrative Procedure Act and due process cases after
Crowell on its holding concerning decisional authority on administrative and constitutional
facts. See also FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 371 (suggesting that the delegation of fact-
finding to non-Article III actors might invite a critical evaluation of the Court’s holding that
the “the essential attributes of judicial power” remained in an Article III court); Fallon, supra
note 240, at 926 & n.67 (explaining the erosion of this aspect of Crowell’s doctrine).
346 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 56–57.
347 Id. at 57.
administrative state,340 involved a no-fault statutory compensation scheme for maritime
workers that delegated initial fact-finding authority to the United States Employees’
Compensation Commission.  The Crowell Court held that when private rights are
subject to adjudication by a non-Article III tribunal, the Constitution requires that
questions of law in such cases remain in the authority of Article III judges;341 and also
that authority to review ordinary questions of fact de novo, restricted to the record
before the original non-Article III fact-finder, likewise resides in Article III judges.342
The delegation of fact-finding authority on constitutional or jurisdictional matters
to non-Article III personnel was constitutional only where Article III courts retained
the final decision-making power, determined by review de novo, based on a plenary
record not restricted to that used by the non-Article III fact-finder.343
It was critical to the Crowell Court’s holding that some delegation of fact-finding
was constitutional where “fundamental rights are in question,” Article III judges
exercised “constant superintendence,” “direction,” and “the court’s . . . control” of
the non-Article III fact-finder,344 and that final decisional authority remained in an
Article III court.345  Further, the Court registered the tensions in delegation jurispru-
dence between constitutional values including due process and the separation of
powers on the one hand, and the phenomenon of the rise of the administrative state
on the other.  Noting the threat to judicial power and thus the separation of powers if
final determinations of fact lie outside the authority of Article III courts,346 “wherever
fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and
finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law,”347 it emphasized at the same time
the virtues of delegation in areas, like the compensation for maritime workers’ death
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354 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79.
355 Id.; see also id. at 81 (referring to the “authority—and the responsibility—to make an
informed, final determination . . . [which] remains with the judge” (quoting Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976)), and the requirement that “the ultimate decision is made
by the district court” (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683)); Fallon, supra note 320, at 294.
356 Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683.
and disability at issue in Crowell, with a high caseload, “thus relieving the courts of
a most serious burden while preserving their complete authority to insure the proper
application of the law.”348  Fallon et al. gloss the Crowell decision thus:  “Article III
concerns were implicated when Congress assigned adjudication to an administrative
agency . . . [b]ecause federal agencies may be . . . susceptible . . . to manipulation or
control by Congress or the President.”349
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the leading
case on constitutional limitations on vesting judicial powers in legislative courts, the
Court struck down a bankruptcy statute that permitted an Article I court to adjudicate
contract disputes between private parties, subject to review by one or more Article III
Courts based on a “clearly-erroneous standard.”350  The Northern Pipeline plurality
distinguished the bankruptcy statute at issue in that case from the compensation statute
at issue in Crowell on the basis that the latter involved “the adjudication of congres-
sionally created rights”351 and because of the narrow fact-finding role assigned to the
commissioners in that case, their lack of enforcement power, and the relatively wide-
ranging appeals available.352
As to the intra-court delegation case United States v. Raddatz,353 which had autho-
rized the statutory delegation to federal magistrate judges of initial decision making
on pretrial motions, including those which concerned alleged violations of constitu-
tional—rather than purely statutory—rights, the Northern Pipeline plurality distin-
guished it on the basis of “sufficient control” being retained by an Article III court.354
This was achieved through “the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommenda-
tions . . . [being] subject to de novo review [of the transcript] by the district court,
which was free to rehear the evidence or to call for additional evidence,” and the pro-
visions specifying that “the magistrate considered motions only upon reference from
the district court, and that the magistrates were appointed, and subject to removal,
by the district court,” thus “clearly” reposing “ultimate decisionmaking authority . . .
with the district court.”355  In the language of Raddatz, delegation does not violate
Article III of the Constitution so long as “the ultimate decision is made by the district
court.”356
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364 Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus the “‘essential attributes of the judicial power’”357 remained with an
Article III court.  For the Northern Pipeline plurality, two principles guided ques-
tions of the constitutionality of delegation of Article III adjudicatory power:  there
is “substantial discretion to . . . assign[ ] to an adjunct . . . some functions historically
performed by judges;”358 however, “the functions of the adjunct [decision maker]
must be limited in such a way that ‘the essential attributes’ of judicial power are
retained in the Art. III court.”359  The provision of judicial review was not sufficient
to render the delegation to bankruptcy judges constitutional, because “constitutional
requirements for the exercise of judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudica-
tion, and not only on appeal.”360  Accordingly, the power to delegate adjudicatory
functions in relation to constitutional rights was more limited than was the case
where statutory rights were involved.361
Relevant to the unconstitutionality of the bankruptcy statute were the breadth
of the kinds of determinations the bankruptcy court made;362 its plenary jurisdiction;363
the range of its powers, which encompassed “all ordinary powers of district courts,
including the power to preside over jury trials, the power to issue declaratory judg-
ments, the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, and the power to issue any order,
process, or judgment appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of [the bank-
ruptcy statute];”364 the fact that appellate review of the bankruptcy court’s decision
was on the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard rather than the de novo review
provided for by the statute at issue in Crowell; and the fact that the bankruptcy court’s
judgments were final and “binding and enforceable even in the absence of an appeal.”365
Ironically in context, Congress had not constituted the bankruptcy courts as Article III
courts in part because of
an aggressive lobbying effort by the Judicial Conference of the
United States . . . and Chief Justice Warren Burger to prevent the
conferral of Article III status on bankruptcy judges. . . . [T]he
Article III judiciary must remain relatively small to retain the
elite status that has traditionally lured first-rate lawyers to the
federal bench.366
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Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 661 & n.19
(1999).
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372 Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court
Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 87–88, 145 (1988).
373 Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND.
L.J. 291, 304–05 (1990).
374 James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 743–47 (2004).
375 Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 600
(1985); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 379 (posing the rhetorical question
“[w]hy is the need for an independent adjudicator not greatest, rather than weakest, in cases
between the government and an individual?”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending The Marathon:
It Is Time to Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 321–22 (1991); Kenneth
S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the Historical Rationale of
the Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013 (1994); Martin H. Redish & Daniel
J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study
in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 407, 420–29 (1995);
Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and
Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2610 (1998) (“Current rules about delegation permit
While rights of appeal to the circuits are statutory rather than constitutional, they are
of a different quality to the delegated adjudication of statutory workers’ compensation
entitlements in Crowell, “incidental to Congress’ power to define the [compensatory]
right that it has created.”367  And while the Article III nondelegation doctrine may
reveal an “indifferen[ce] to where cases are adjudicated in the first instance,”368 there
is much emphasis in Crowell and the language of the Northern Pipeline plurality—
sounding in thick Article III values of guarding against arbitrary government power,
fairness to litigants, and rule of law values369—on requiring some level of appellate
review by an Article III court of delegated primary decision making.370  Leading fed-
eral courts scholars have made versions of this argument, Fallon suggesting that
“sufficiently searching appellate review by an Article III court as both necessary and
sufficient to legitimate initial adjudication by a federal legislative court or adminis-
trative agency;”371 Richard Saphire and Michael Solimine372 and Daniel Meltzer373
arguing that it is necessary but not sufficient; and James Pfander suggesting that over-
sight of inferior tribunal adjudication by Article III actors might be constitutionally
exercised by the availability of the prerogative writs and not just by conventional
appellate review.374
What of public rights cases?  Judith Resnik has suggested the irony of denying
Article III review of decisions in disputes between individuals and the government
while requiring them in disputes between private parties.375  Paradoxically, given the
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the thinnest protection of ‘Article III values’ to [public rights cases] . . . in which the govern-
ment is often a litigant and in which the reasons to have an independent judiciary appear to be
at their height.”).
376  See, e.g., David S. Udell & Rebekah Diller, Access to the Courts: An Essay for the
Georgetown University Law Center Conference on the Independence of the Courts, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1127, 1142–51 (2007).
377 See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? Lessons Learned from Litigation
Over the 1996 Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113 (2007).
378 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION 27, 35 (1996) (acknowledging the employment of pro se law clerks to screen pro
se filings, including prisoner civil rights actions and habeas corpus petitions); Ann H. Mathews,
Note, The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive
Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 536, 544 & n.46 (2002) (noting that the federal district courts began
to rely heavily on pro se law clerks to limit prisoner litigation in the early 1980s).
379 478 U.S. 833 (1985).
380 The balancing test emerged in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,
473 U.S. 568 (1985). See Fallon, supra note 320, at 929–31. It was arguably abandoned in
Granfinanciara, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54–55 (1989). See FALLON ET AL., supra
note 311, at 397–99.
381 Farrell, supra note 318, at 293 (glossing Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–56, 863 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“The Court requires that the legislative interest in convenience and efficiency
be weighed against the competing interest in judicial independence.”)).
normative discourse of the majority in Crowell and the plurality in Northern Pipeline,
access to review of governmental action by the Article III judiciary has been eroded
in categories of cases where litigants are particularly vulnerable to abuses of govern-
ment power, and typically receive little protection from the institutions of majoritarian
democracy,376 for example in asylum matters,377 military court and veteran’s benefits
appeals.  Article III values are likewise compromised in cases when primary decision
making is also intra-institutionally delegated, for example where a district court
assigns to staff attorneys the “processing” of § 1983 prison conditions cases.378  The
role of appellate review is, then, becoming increasingly rather than decreasingly im-
portant in protecting individuals against unfair treatment by the government and over-
reaching exercises of government power.
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,379 the Court moved away
from formalist distinctions between public and private rights cases in determining
delegated Article III power questions and established a balancing test380 for the consti-
tutionality of the delegating of Article III power to a person not holding Article III
office.  That balancing test weighs the compromising of “Article III values (fairness
to individual litigants based on an independent judiciary and separation of powers)”
against “the benefits of delegations of authority to settle civil disputes (efficiency and
expertise).”381  The Schor Court’s list of the factors to be weighed in functionalist
separation of powers analysis comprises
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382 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. The Court additionally notes that the petitioner “voluntarily
dismissed the federal court action and presented its debit balance claim by way of a counter-
claim in the CFTC reparations proceeding.” Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
383 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 397–99.
384 Schor, 478 U.S. at 855.
385 Id. at 860–61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
386 Id. at 860.
387 FALLON ET AL., supra note 311, at 406.
the extent to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are
reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.382
Thus Schor, especially when viewed from the hindsight cast by Granfinanciara’s
return to functionalism,383 leaves us with a binary:  the Court’s deferential treatment
of delegated primary review in public rights cases; and its continuing, albeit eroding,
requirement of Article III oversight in private rights cases.  The functionalist balancing
Schor deploys emphasizes that this body of doctrine, whether formalist or function-
alist, is riddled with articulation of norms that pull in opposite directions, as when
the Court emphasized in one breath the relevance to the determination of the con-
stitutionality of delegation of Article III power and “the degree of judicial control
saved to the federal courts, as well as the congressional purpose behind the jurisdic-
tional delegation, the demonstrated need for the delegation, and the limited nature
of the delegation.”384
This binary pull contrasts with the more abstract and yet foundational concerns
expressed in Justice Brennan’s dissent, in which Justice Marshall joined, where con-
stitutional values speak with one voice:  the “impartial adjudication” and protection
of Constitutional rights that might be “expected” from judges with constitutional
security of tenure and salary protections,385 and the understanding that “a principal
benefit of the separation of the judicial power . . . would be the protection of indi-
vidual litigants from decisionmakers susceptible to majoritarian pressures.”386
What is the specific relevance of this body of doctrine taken as a whole, to ques-
tions of the constitutionality of intra-court delegation of Article III power?  Discussing
federal magistrate judges, Fallon et al. have asked whether the fact that they function
inside Article III courts rather than outside them makes it “clear that . . . [this] should
alleviate, rather than heighten, constitutional concern.”387  Citing what they describe
as “a provocative student Note,” Fallon et al. raise questions about whether intra-
court delegation of Article III power will produce “discrimination both among classes
of litigants and areas of the law, with some receiving disproportionate inattention,”
and surrogates being delegated responsibility for adjudicating claims involving
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388 Id. at 406–07 (quoting Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction
of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1053 (1979)).
389 Note, supra note 388.
390 Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 28, at 53–58.
391 Note, supra note 388, at 1056–57.
392 Id. at 1041–58.
393 Id. at 1046.
“‘simple cases and needy litigants.’”388  They go on to quote at length from the note,
which identifies the “role problems arising from the magistrate’s dual position as
judicial subordinate and independent adjudicator,”389 strikingly similar to those which
I have argued390 characterize clerk and staff attorney adjudicatory behavior:
[T]he magistrate is not a judge.  In addition to the familiar “con-
trol” of appellate review that all higher federal tribunals exercise
over the judges of lower courts, the magistrate is also subject to a
qualitatively different form of bureaucratic control that may attend
district court authority to determine his reappointment prospects
and, more importantly, the day-to-day contents of his docket.
Moreover, district judges must evaluate the magistrate’s deci-
sional record in the course of exercising their administrative func-
tions, if only in order to maintain the standards of the court.  This
ongoing, informal oversight creates the risk of impermissible
intrusion on the magistrate’s substantive decisions.  The danger
is not that magistrates will come to function as judicial alter egos,
but rather that they may be encouraged to adopt a risk-averse
strategy of adjudication by the pressure of judicial scrutiny, a
strategy eschewing unconventional decisions that might otherwise
be prompted by novel legal claims or by pressing factual idiosyn-
cracies.  Such “judicious” decisionmaking would be inconsistent
with the premise that the magistrate is capable of serving as the
functional equivalent of the judge.  It would be equally inconsis-
tent with the broader policy of autonomous adjudication within
the federal courts that underlies the Article III judicial office.391
The note additionally documents concerns about the constitutionality of delegat-
ing Article III adjudication to surrogates that accompanied the authorization by the
Judicial Conference (under color of amendments to the Magistrates Act) of increasing
use of magistrates in the 1960s and 1970s,392 concluding that “the acceptance achieved
by magistrate habeas hearings may reveal less about the [constitutional] risks [of dele-
gated adjudication] that they entail than about the countervailing pressures on over-
crowded courts that have rendered those risks acceptable.”393  Also of salience to this
Article, the note reports legislative history of the Magistrates Act amendments which
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395 Id. at 1043.
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397 See Judith Resnik, Trials as Errors, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837
(1984) (critiquing the unfairness produced by a stratified adjudicatory system).
registered that “law clerks performed the specific function of reviewing and reporting
on prisoner petitions,”394 and concludes that
one characteristic that habeas petitions share with prisoner civil
rights petitions makes them especially poor subjects for experi-
ments conducted on the edges of Article III:  for the most part,
they are brought by state prisoners requesting a federal court to set
aside a state court verdict, often on grounds already rejected by
a state’s highest tribunal.  Prior to Wedding, [which briefly out-
lawed magistrate fact-finding in habeas cases, in part because of
concerns395 about delegated adjudication, before itself being over-
taken by Magistrates Act amendments authorizing a broad scope
of Magistrate work] it was suggested that under these circum-
stances less confident magistrates may sometimes be reluctant to
grant relief even when it is warranted.  Yet a more pressing consti-
tutional argument against magistrate evidentiary hearings rests on
comity and federalism principles.  The resentment already felt by
state court judges at being overturned by a district court may be
heightened by the suspicion that the reversal was in practice the
work of a magistrate, and de facto magistrate adjudication also
triggers concern about impermissible forms of federal intervention
in the state judiciary.396
Where do the Article III delegation cases leave us on the question of intra-court
delegation without formally “legislative” authority to court staff, the majority of
whom have much less legal experience than the contemporary federal magistracy?
The language of “Article III courts” rather than “Article III judges” in Schor might
suggest the federal courts of appeals’ delegation practices are managing to skirt con-
stitutional infirmity.  The clustering of “public rights” cases on the screening track,
reflecting the formalist group of delegation cases, might also suggest this conclu-
sion.  The appellate courts’ hierarchy of treatment of appeals397 adjudicated by
Article III personnel and those consigned to the “screening” track corresponds
roughly with the hierarchy of values established in the jurisprudence on delegation
of primary decision making.
Nonetheless, values like the fair treatment of litigants and the independence
promoted by the tenure and salary protections of Article III office, the insistence in
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formalist cases like Crowell and Northern Pipeline on the necessary safeguard of
Article III review for constitutional delegated adjudication, and the emphasis Raddatz
places on decisions being made by Article III officeholders do not suggest that the
delegation of Article III adjudication to junior, often under-supervised adjuncts whose
competence the judges themselves do not trust passes constitutional muster.  Nor does
the balancing of functionalist separation of powers values—“fairness to individual
litigants based on an independent judiciary and separation of powers,” measured
against “efficiency and expertise”—undergird the nonprecedential status rules and
the practices they justify and enable as they do the decision in Schor.  Rather, asserted
efficiency with admitted lack of expertise trumps all other values.
Likewise, the silent and obscure delegation of Article III power to under-supervised
and underqualified adjuncts within the courts themselves is not the equivalent of the
transparent delegation of Article III power, as in Raddatz and Schor:  the Schor Court
relied significantly on apparent legislative approbation of the CFTC’s actions in
authorizing the CFTC’s adjudication of common law counterclaims arising out of
reparations actions for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act under color of
regulations the CFTC had issued.398  Additionally, given the frequency with which
the government wins—not always because of the merits—in unpublished opinion
cases,399 neither the Article III guarantees of what might be characterized as litigants’
rights of access to “impartial and independent federal adjudication,”400 nor “‘the con-
stitutional system of checks and balances,’”401 are advanced by the federal appeals
courts’ delegation practices.  Rather, the circuits become laws unto themselves.
The discourse on the unworthiness of pariah classes of matters and litigants for
actual Article III appellate adjudication documented in Part I.A and analysis of the
results in the other leading Article III cases in Part III.A indicates that the hierarchy
of adjudicatory treatment institutionalized in the contemporary courts of appeals is
the product of constitutional solipsism, of highly interested adjudication, which sees
courts privileging their interests rather than focusing on their responsibility to fair and
disinterested balancing of the claims of state and subject within the bounds estab-
lished by differing standards of review.
All this said, current inherent Article III nondelegation doctrine provides limited
assistance in determining the constitutionality of one of the practices that undergird
nonprecedential status rules:  intra-court delegation.  It has more than one standard.
The logic of the hierarchy of standards is counter-intuitive from a perspective valuing
judicial independence and the separation of powers as protections for individuals chal-
lenging overreaching government power or unfair treatment at the hands of the state.
Private (property) rights and private disputes trump all others as meriting Article III
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402 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S.
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1990 YEARBOOK (1990), available at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_library/subs
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in the case: that making factual determinations and on that basis recommending the payment
of war service pensions to Revolutionary War veterans was not judicial in nature; and that the
fact that the Secretary of War had jurisdiction to decide whether to act on the recommendations
contravened the separation of powers by providing for appellate review by the executive,
rather than as constitutionally required by an Article III court. Tushnet notes that the decision
was influenced by the judges’ concern about their workload.
adjudication.  And the administrative state is a fact of legal institutional life, its judicial
review norms arguably infecting the operations of the courts themselves.  Further,
while unlike the right of access doctrine, the delegation doctrine operates within the
four corners of Article III, it is likewise facially incapable of addressing the constitu-
tionality of nonprecedential status rules themselves or of practices other than dele-
gation, and is beset by the same standing and evidentiary difficulties.
III. TOWARD A “THICK” DOCTRINE OF ARTICLE III POWER
Thus, the authority bearing on the constitutionality of nonprecedential status
rules and the practices they justify and enable is fragmented, none of it provides a
conclusive doctrinal basis for a doctrine of Article III power that would resolve the
constitutionality question, and a plethora of practical barriers complicates bringing
a constitutionality challenge.  The existing thin doctrines of Article III power are
unequal to the crisis of injustice in federal appellate adjudication.
Nonetheless, the existing authority discussed in Parts I.C and II.C points to con-
stitutional logic which insistently calls into question the constitutionality of nonprece-
dential status rules and the practices that underpin them.  In this Part, I critically
analyze two bodies of inherent Article III power jurisprudence that suggest the content
of a thick doctrine of Article III power.
A. Critical Reading of Inherent Article III Separation of Powers Cases
The leading separation of federal constitutional powers cases arise procedurally
when the legislature (or executive) encroaches on “judicial prerogatives.”  As indi-
cated in Part II.A.2.b, the practical likelihood of legislative action in relation to non-
precedential status rules is not high; as a pragmatic matter, if such action were to be
taken, the Court is unlikely to find in Congress’s favor.  Nonetheless, these are among
the most developed articulations of the scope and nature of the inherent powers of
Article III courts, and thus any theory of Article III power must address them.
Their doctrinal essences yield little.  Hayburn’s Case has been held to “stand[]
for the principle that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts
in officials of the Executive Branch.”402  In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., finding
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL SOLIPSISM 1019
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precise scope of Klein . . . later decisions have made [it] clear that its prohibition does not take
hold when Congress ‘amends applicable law.’”)).
404 Id. (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).
405 Id. at 218–19.
406 Id. at 219.
407 Id. at 222 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke
ed., 1961)).
408 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
409 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
37–41 (1997).
410 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 222 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton)
(J. Cooke ed., 1961)); see also id. at 226 (referring to the unconstitutionality of “revision,”
“control,” or “suspension” of decisions of Article III courts by the legislature).
411 Id. at 223, 226 (“[J]udgments of Article III courts are ‘final and conclusive upon the
rights of the parties.’” (quoting Chief Justice Taney in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S.
697, app. at 702 (decided 1864, reported1885))); see also id. at 227 (holding that a “judicial
unconstitutional a federal statute which reinstated jurisdiction that the Court had
stripped itself of, the Court identified three types of unconstitutional incursions on
Article III power:  statutes “‘prescrib[ing] rules of decision to the Judicial Department
of the government in cases pending before it;’”403 Hayburn-type, “vest[ing] review
of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch;”404 and those
entrenching on the authority “to decide . . . [cases], subject to review only by superior
courts in the Article III hierarchy,”405 contravened in Plaut by the legislature “retro-
actively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments.”406  This last group
is most germane to assessing the constitutionality of nonprecedential status rules and
the practices they justify and enable.  The nondelegation subset of that group has been
analyzed in Part II.C.2.
There is another way of making sense of the leading inherent judicial power cases,
through close critical reading which attends to what really makes a difference between
what powers are ruled to be “indefeasibly vested” in Article III courts, and those
where legislation changing the way federal courts traditionally do business is held by
the Court to pass constitutional muster.  Such analysis yields evidence of norms of
Article III judging practice of use in generating a thick theory of Article III power.
Expanding on the nature of Article III power, the Plaut Court distinguished the
legislative power to “‘prescribe the rules by which the duties and rights of every
citizen are to be regulated,’”407 from the judicial power of “‘the interpretation of the
laws,’”408 a formulation that sounds in Scalian contempt for the common law.409
Inferential support for nonprecedential status rules can also be found in the articulation
of unconstitutionality of the legislature “revis[ing] a judicial sentence . . . revers[ing]
a determination once made, in a particular case.”410
Similarly tending to support the constitutionality of nonprecedential status rules
and their underlying practices is the Court’s emphasis on the “binding effect[s] of . . .
[the judicial branch’s] acts . . . [being] limited to particular cases and controversies,”411
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decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or
controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable
to that very case was something other than the courts said it was”). Justice Breyer’s concurrence
also approvingly quotes Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
136 (1810), to the effect that “[i]t is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe
general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in
society would seem to be the duty of other departments.” Plaut, 514 U.S. at 242 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 246 (identifying generality as a characteristic of legislation).
412 Id. at 223 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke
ed., 1961)).
413 Id. at 225 (quoting 4 R. BASLER, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268
(1953) (First Inaugural Address 1861)).
414 Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
415 See id. (observing that “the legislation disfavors not plaintiffs but defendants”); see
also id. at 248 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying Congress’s intent to benefit the “aggrieved
class” of investors).
and thus limiting the judiciary’s ability to endanger “the general liberty of the
people.”412  Justice Scalia’s quotation for the Court from Lincoln on Dred Scott and
the doctrine of precedent is particularly salient in context:
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny
that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties
to a suit, as to the object of that suit. . . .  And while it is obvi-
ously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given
case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that partic-
ular case, with the chance that it may be over-ruled, and never be-
come a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could
the evils of a different practice.413
Likewise offering inferential support for a limited doctrine of precedent, Justice
Breyer’s concurrence identifies “ordinary legislative activity” as normally “pro-
vid[ing] . . . assurances against ‘singling out’ . . . [including] prospectivity and
general applicability.”414
Those who lost out as a result of the Court’s sua sponte jurisdiction stripping
in Plaut were one-shotters,415 and Justice Stevens’s dissent has a signally different
emphasis from the opinion of the Court on what characterizes judicial power:
The Framers rejected that [colonial legislatures’] practice [of
appellate review of judicial decisions], not out of a mechanistic
solicitude for ‘final judgments,’ but because they believed the
impartial application of rules of law, rather than the will of the
majority, must govern the disposition of individual cases and
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controversies.  Any legislative interference in the adjudication
of the merits of a particular case carries the risk that political
power will supplant even-handed justice, whether the interference
occurs before or after the entry of final judgment. . . .  [The dis-
puted amendment] neither commands the reinstatement of any
particular case nor directs any result on the merits.  Congress
recently granted a special benefit to a single litigant in a pending
civil rights case [which “was intended to exempt a single dispa-
rate impact lawsuit against the Wards Cove Packing Company”],
but the Court saw no need even to grant certiorari to review that
disturbing legislative favor.  In an ironic counterpoint, the Court
today places a higher priority on protecting the Republic from
the restoration to a large class of litigants of the opportunity to
have Article III courts resolve the merits of their claims. . . .  We
should regard favorably . . . legislation that enables the judiciary
to overcome impediments to the performance of its mission of
administering justice impartially, even when, as here, the Court
has created the impediment.416
In the Court’s most recent inherent Article III power case, Miller v. French,417
by contrast to the holding in Plaut, the Court found constitutional a provision of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, a paradigmatic jurisdiction-stripping statute, which
disadvantaged prisoners bringing § 1983 prison conditions actions.
Responding to the prisoner’s contention that the time limit imposed by the pro-
vision offended against separation of powers principles, the Court privileged the role
of the judiciary over the safeguarding of individual rights, and, separating Bill of
Rights protections from its model of Article III power, articulated an Article III power
doctrine with the narrowest of scopes:
Respondents’ concern with the time limit . . . must be its relative
brevity.  But whether the time is so short that it deprives litigants
of a meaningful opportunity to be heard is a due process question,
an issue that is not before us.  We leave open, therefore, the ques-
tion whether this time limit, particularly in a complex case, may
implicate due process concerns.
In contrast to due process, which principally serves to protect
the personal rights of litigants to a full and fair hearing, separation
of powers principles are primarily addressed to the structural
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Due process analysis balances the private and government interests at stake in the liti-
gation, the tendency of the procedure adopted to enhance decisional quality, and what the
procedure costs the government. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). “The
goal of the balancing exercise is the efficient and accurate application of law to facts.” Farrell,
supra note 318, at 296. The larger values underlying the confluence of Article III and due
process analysis are “the collective interests in the separation of powers, the cost of the
procedure to the public, and the accuracy it would produce, as well as individual interests in
neutrality and fairness.” Id. at 297. Thus, while it may be possible to design and administer
a system of constitutionally delegating Article III power in appellate decision making to surro-
gates, the present system does not achieve this.
concerns of protecting the role of the independent Judiciary418
within the constitutional design.  In this action, we have no occa-
sion to decide whether there could be a time constraint on judi-
cial action that was so severe that it implicated these structural
separation of powers concerns.419
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justices Souter and Ginsburg took a
broader view of Article III power, and one sounding in a conventional understanding
of common law precedent.  They agreed “that applying the automatic stay may raise
the due process issue” and “may also raise a serious separation-of-powers issue if the
time it allows turns out to be inadequate for a court to determine whether the new
prerequisite to relief is satisfied in a particular case.”420
Dissenting, Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joined, drew dramatic
attention to the stakes potentially involved in prison conditions litigation, vividly
cataloging inhumane breaches of the Eighth Amendment in the prison conditions
case Morales Feliciano v. Romero Barcelo.421  The dissent emphasized not only the
centrality of “fairness” to Article III power, but also the responsibility of those exer-
cising Article III power to safeguard the constitutional rights of the powerless, those
for whom the institutions of majoritarian democracy provide little protection.  The
dissent’s account of Article III power also suggested that Article III power and Bill of
Rights protections are intertwined:  “So read, the statute directly interferes with a
court’s exercise of its traditional equitable authority, rendering temporarily ineffective
pre-existing remedies aimed at correcting past, and perhaps ongoing, violations of
the Constitution.”422
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Just as separation of powers disputes about prison conditions appeals and the
equitable injunction lie at the heart of Miller v. French, so questions of humanity arise,
and echoes of the nation’s founding inequality reverberate in United States v. Klein.423
In an opinion sounding in both equality and the centrality of fairness and fair proce-
dures to Article III power, making a stand on behalf of those out of favor with the state,
the Court emphasized that the original confiscation legislation did not divest confed-
erate property holders of their property “unless in pursuance of a judgment rendered
after due legal proceedings,” recognizing “to the fullest extent the humane maxims of
the modern law of nations, which exempt private property of noncombatant enemies
from capture as booty of war,” and sparingly applying the law of confiscation.424
While registering that Congress has constitutional power “to make exceptions
and prescribe regulations” of the appellate power of Article III courts,425 the Court
emphasized procedural fairness and the importance of judicial independence in dis-
putes between individuals and the state.  The Court held that in “allowing one party
to [a] . . . controversy to decide it in its own favor . . . [and] allowing that the legisla-
ture may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department . . . in cases pending
before it,”426 the legislation “passed the limit which separates the legislative from the
judicial power.”427  Posing a rhetorical question of considerable salience to this
Article, given the evidence of structural subordination that is justified and enabled
by nonprecedential status rules, the Klein Court said:
Congress has already provided that the Supreme Court shall have
jurisdiction of the judgments of the Court of Claims on appeal.
Can it prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must
deny itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only be-
cause its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse
to the government and favorable to the suitor?  This question
seems to us to answer itself.428
In Mistretta, the Court considered an aspect of nondelegation doctrine and
Article III power that goes to an essential characterizing of judicial power rather than
to the legality of de facto delegation of Article III appellate judging to staff:  the per-
missible delegation of power that appeared to be prima facie political, because it
involved making policy, to the judiciary, and the collateral erosion of the “‘integrity
of the Judicial Branch.’”429  The Court characterized making sentencing policy, like
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making procedural rules for the lower federal courts,430 as falling in a “‘twilight area’
in which the activities of the separate Branches merge,”431 because Congress may vest
in the Article III judiciary “nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench on the pre-
rogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the
Judiciary.”432  It concluded that “the significantly political nature of the Commission’s
work [did not] render[ ] unconstitutional its placement within the Judicial Branch,”433
and that this placement was authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause.434  Its rea-
soning was as follows:  “sentencing,” the Court concluded, “is a field in which the
Judicial Branch long has exercised substantive or political judgment,”435 and in which
it possesses “special knowledge and expertise.”436  Indeed, sentencing is a “uniquely
judicial subject,” lying “close to the heart of the judicial function.”437
The Mistretta Court’s analogy between the making of sentencing policy by the
Federal Sentencing Commission and the making of rules under Article I delegation
for the lower federal courts by the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court would
not apparently stretch to encompass the making of local nonprecedential status rules.
This is because, as indicated in Part II.A.2.b, as they apparently affect substantive
rights, they exceed legitimate delegated rule-making power.
What of the alchemical Mistretta logic that assigning policy-making to the Federal
Sentencing Commission and to individual Article III judges is constitutionally permis-
sible because the subject matter of such policy “is a field in which the Judicial Branch
long has exercised substantive or political judgment;”438 in which it possesses “special
knowledge and expertise;”439 and is a “uniquely judicial subject,” lying “close to the
heart of the judicial function”?440  Surely judgments about the doctrine of precedent
lie even closer to the core of the judicial function?
The flaw in this suggested analogy lies in the distinction between making essen-
tially political decisions about what conduct should be criminalized and how crimes
should be punished (which in the U.S. constitutional context, with the largely seamless
doxa that there can be no common law crimes, is a matter thought to be within the
exclusive power of the legislature), and the quintessentially legal quality of judg-
ments about the doctrine of precedent.  The latter is legal, not political, and thus the
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constitutionality of making nonprecedential status rules cannot be determined through
Mistretta’s logic.  Rather, if such rule-making power is constitutional, it must lie
within the four corners of Article III.
B. Essential to the Administration of Justice/Functioning of the Judiciary
Even if essential to the administration of justice or the functioning of the judiciary,
exercises of Article III power cannot stand if they circumvent or are in conflict with
the Constitution.  As discussed in Part II.A.2.b, they may also be ultra vires if they
conflict with legislation or regulations.  Thus, the authority on “essential” Article III
judicial power does not stand alone in determining the constitutionality of nonprece-
dential status rules or the practices they justify and enable.  It can, however, provide
guidance in generating a thick doctrine of Article III power.
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton held that federal district courts could, in the
exercise of the inherent power to initiate prosecutions for criminal contempts extend-
ing to cases of out-of-court contempts, appoint private attorneys as prosecutors of such
contempts.441  They could not, however, appoint counsel acting for a party that was
a beneficiary of a court order as a prosecutor in a case of alleged contempt of that
order;442 and they should exercise the power to appoint private attorneys to prosecute
contempts only where the public prosecutorial authorities deny a request to prosecute.443
The Court’s reasoning emphasized the “underlying concern” of avoiding the
appearance of interested prosecuting:  “diminish[ing] faith in the fairness of the crim-
inal justice system in general.”444  It also stressed the imbalance of power between a
citizen prosecuted for a crime and the government.445  The purpose of the prosecu-
tion of contempt as “essential to the administration of justice,”446 and to maintaining
“respect for the judicial system itself,”447 is protecting the authority and thus the inde-
pendence of the judicial branch.448  However, that authority is limited by consider-
ations of propriety, disinterest, and the restraint implied in “necessity,”449 reflected in
the development of a body of procedural fairness doctrine in contempt cases.450  What
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might be characterized as fundamental constitutional values of procedural fairness
are also reflected in Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, characterizing the appointment
of an “interested party’s counsel to prosecute for criminal contempt” as a “violation
of [Constitutional] due process,”451 once again illustrating the close relationships
between Article III power and due process.
By contrast, Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, concluded that Article III
judicial power “necessary to the exercise of all others”452 is narrow:
The [Article III] judicial power is the power to decide, in accor-
dance with law, who should prevail in a case or controversy.  That
includes the power to serve as a neutral adjudicator in a criminal
case, but does not include the power to seek out law violators in
order to punish them—which would be quite incompatible with
the task of neutral adjudication.453
His thin account of inherent federal judicial power is confined to “those powers
necessary to protect the functioning of . . . [the Judicial Branch’s] own processes.”454
Advancing a version of his argument against the federal courts being considered com-
mon law courts,455 he characterizes “modern judicial decrees” as having “the binding
effect of laws for those to whom they apply.”456  Thus, narrow as it is, his view of
Article III power might well embrace nonprecedential status rules themselves, unless
the “cases and controversies” limitation led him to conclude that this type of Article III
power did not authorize abstract generalized ex ante rule making.457
In Michaelson v. United States—authority for the proposition that while Congress
may “reasonably” regulate Article III power to punish contempt, “the attributes which
inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative,”458—the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of
a federal statute which provided for trial by jury rather than summary prosecution
of what the Court characterized as (out of court) criminal contempts “where the act
or thing constituting the contempt is also a crime in the ordinary sense.”459  For the
Michaelson Court, the legislature’s providing individuals charged with contempts with
expanded procedural fairness rights, analogous to those provided by constitutional
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criminal procedural guarantees, was that which authorized statutory limitations on
the Article III power of lower federal courts.460
Chambers v. NASCO upheld the constitutionality of an exercise of “essential”
judicial power sanctioning a litigant for “abuse[ ] of process occurring beyond the
courtroom”461 where those sanctions were not authorized by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.  The Court relied, inter alia, on the fact that Chambers was given an
“appropriate hearing”462 on the abuse of process charges and that the sanctions were
imposed after detailed fact-finding by the sanctioning court.463
Given the emphasis on procedural fairness and constitutional values in the
“essential” judicial power jurisprudence, then, as well as the focus on comparatively
uncontroversial powers like that to sanction or to hold a litigant in contempt, it seems
unlikely that nonprecedential status rules are authorized by this type of inherent judi-
cial power, and a fortiori (leaving aside apparently insurmountable practical problems
of proof of matters internal to courts) that treating similarly situated litigants differ-
ently; delegating Article III authority; substituting certiorari review for genuine appel-
late review to the requisite standard; or structurally subordinating decision making,
would be within Article III judicial power.
C. Constitutional Logic
The judicial diplomats who prompted the national adoption of institutionalized
unpublication in the 1970s and their successors who, almost three decades later,
achieved the passage of FRAP 32.1 were uneasy about the constitutionality of non-
precedential status rules.464  As well they might have been:  to the extent that they
mean what they say, that is, that they authorize treating similarly situated litigants dif-
ferently if the authority that a litigant seeks to rely on is a formally nonprecedential
opinion, there is authority for the proposition that nonprecedential status rules are
ultra vires Article III courts because they render substantive lawmaking under color
of court rules.465  Further, as discussed in Part III.B, there are plausible grounds for
concluding that Article III courts do not possess the essential power to strip their
decisions of precedential value.
That said, there is presently a split between the circuit court opinions that have
addressed the question of the constitutionality of nonprecedential status rules.
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Anastasoff and Hart spend much energy on making opposing originalist cases which
are, in the end, unpersuasive.  Hart’s other reasoning is disingenuous:  the discourse
on the necessity for nonprecedential status rules sounds overtly in the necessity to free
judicial time for crafting a small universe of tightly reasoned published opinions,466
at the considerable cost to litigants denied genuine access to an Article III decision
maker, and the opinion does not acknowledge what its author has acknowledged else-
where, that it is not Article III judges who do the writing of the opinions to which
precedential status is denied.467
What remains in the leading authority on nonprecedential status rules and on
Article III power is a thick residue of normative constitutional standards.  As to
Anastasoff and the Tenth Circuit Rules case, their reasoning is explicitly based in such
constitutional logic.  The crux of the reasoning in the Tenth Circuit Rules case is that
a litigant “who can point to a prior decision of the court and demonstrate that he is
entitled to prevail under it should be able to do so as a matter of essential justice and
fundamental fairness,”468 and that nonprecedential status rules suggest “constitutional
infringement because of . . . arbitrariness, irrationality, and unequal treatment.”469
The normative crux of Judge Arnold’s ultra vires jurisprudence likewise sounds in the
arbitrariness of the rules and what they formally justify,470 their lack of principle, and
their authorizing unreasoned decision making.471  It manifests an ontological commit-
ment to a domain of legality, distinct from the merely political, and argues for equality
of treatment of litigants, the duty of constitutional judges to protect individual liberties
and constrain excesses of state power.  He additionally articulates values of judicial
expertise and integrity.472
Because of the imbrication of Article III power and due process, the jurispruden-
tial underpinning of the leading authority on the constitutional right of access to the
courts, a right grounded in another overlapping set of doctrines, due process and equal
protection, informs a thick doctrine of Article III power, for all that it lies doctrinally
outside the four corners of Article III.  From this jurisprudence comes the constitu-
tional standard of adequate, effective, and meaningful473 access, emphasis on procedural
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fundamental or “essential”474 fairness, Justice Harlan’s narrow formulation of the
“right not to be denied an appeal for arbitrary or capricious reasons,”475 and the equally
narrow Ross v. Moffitt standard for discretionary criminal appeals, that litigants have
“an adequate opportunity to present . . . claims fairly” in context.476  In its context,
Ross, especially when read against Halbert v. Michigan, might be said to imply the
requirement of a genuine opportunity for error correction in the right of access at the
primary appellate stage.477  Additionally, although equal protection is not as imbricated
in Article III power as is due process, the emphasis of the Supreme Court on equal
protection in the most recent access to courts decision, Halbert, counsels against the
constitutionality of an exercise of Article III power that treats certain classes of liti-
gants as deserving of less access than others,478 a fortiori when differing standards
of review already do this work, transparently.
Nondelegation doctrine, by contrast, reveals a degree of doctrinally encoded
tolerance for differential treatment of litigants in public rights cases of the kinds that
cluster in screening track appeals, and a privileging of private property rights over
others.  Nonetheless, the emphasis on Article III actor control over surrogates and
limitations on the range of adjudicatory tasks performed by them, as on practices like
evidentiary scrutiny that instantiate that control, and the insistence that “ultimate”
decision making remain in an Article III court, all counsel for some limitations on
delegation of appellate review, or safeguards against its unconstitutional exercising.
So does the Schor discourse on judicial independence and separation of powers, for
all its “private rights” context.  This is especially so in cases where, either overtly or
covertly, primary decision making has itself been consigned to surrogates, a fortiori
where those surrogates work in conditions which compromise their independence, for
example in the immigration context or in prison conditions litigation.  The nondele-
gation doctrine authority shows both a split on the Rehnquist Court over how much
delegation of Article III power is constitutionally permissible, and the influence of
judicial self-interest in the permissiveness of adjudicatory delegation doctrine.
These two phenomena also characterize the outcomes of, and the differences of
view that emerge in the recent inherent Article III power cases, Plaut and Miller v.
French.  Consider the normative difference between Justice Stevens’s dissenting
opinion in Plaut and that of Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, on what Article III
power comprises:  for Justice Stevens, impartial justice, a rule of law that trumps ex-
pressions of majoritarian political will, and a skepticism about acceding to jurisdiction
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stripping;479 for Justice Scalia, an idiosyncratically narrow view of the ambit of the
common law.480
The Miller v. French concurrers emphasize the significance of a common law
method for doing justice,481 and the dissenters place stress on both procedural fair-
ness as a touchstone of Article III power, and the stakes that can be involved when
powerless individuals have their rights circumscribed by the state.482  By contrast, the
majority opinion advances a thin formulation of Article III power, and one notable for
its self-interest and solipsistic regard.483  Resonating with the emerging normative
thrust of the liberal wing of the Court are both the early inherent judicial power case,
United States v. Klein,484 and Justice Thomas’s disquisition on Article III power in
Missouri v. Jenkins, where, in a poignantly ironic condemnation of the use of the equi-
table injunction in civil rights jurisprudence in the wake of Brown, he excoriates these
“extravagant uses of judicial power [as] . . . at odds with the history and tradition of
the equity power and the Framers’ design.”485  Both remind us of the abiding historical
context in which Article III jurisprudence operates:  the historical and persisting in-
adequacy of institutions of majoritarian democracy, and of the law that the elected
branches of government makes, to doing equal justice.
Finally, the leading authority on essential Article III power likewise emphasizes
procedural fairness, the role of the judicial branch in correcting imbalances of power
between state and subject, and the limitations that disinterest, rather than solipsism,
should place on judicial power.  It is more tolerant of legislative interventions in
“judicial” matters where such interventions expand rather than contract legal pro-
tections of the rights of individuals in the face of exercises of power by any branch of
government, including the judicial branch.  Here too, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton evidences his narrow view of both Article III power and
the doctrine of precedent.486
The norms that emerge from these diverse groups of cases on Article III power
suggest that while a thick doctrine of Article III power might have variable application
in differing types of appellate cases, such as criminal and civil, those affecting consti-
tutional and other rights and those with less material impacts, the logic of the non-
delegation doctrine is at sharp odds with the normative emphasis across the range of
Article III jurisprudence on the responsibility of Article III judiciary to be especially
vigilant when the subject of adjudication is a dispute between the state and a relatively
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powerless individual.  Further, the recurring emphasis on procedural fairness and
judicial independence suggests that any delegation of appellate decision making to
surrogates must be limited by scrupulous supervision by Article III officers, the
mandating of adjudicatory procedures that tend to produce safe outcomes, and keen
attentiveness to any evidence that screening procedures are based on categories of
defendants and matters.  “Meaningful” access to the courts requires no less.
Vermeule does not recognize Miller v. French for the canary in his doctrinal coal-
mine:  judicial and political branch interests may coincide as regards persons whose
interests are as under protected by unreflective judicial elitism as by the (formally
political) institutions of majoritarian democracy.  When there is a conflict of interest
between the constitutional values for which the separation of powers is a placeholder
and the bureaucratic tunnel vision that Vermeule describes as the basis of the “cogni-
tive”487 tendency “toward judicial overprotection of judicial power and prerogatives,”488
and I identify as constitutional solipsism, a thick rather than thin Article III doctrine is
called for, because, as Vermeule himself recognizes, without recognizing its signifi-
cance for his reading of Miller v. French,
[t]he federal judiciary has, both before and since the New Deal,
acquiesced in the congressional creation of an extraordinary
range of administrative and quasi-administrative agencies and
tribunals that exercise adjudicatory power outside the Article III
system.  If some or all of those responsibilities had been vested
in the federal judiciary, then . . . [i]nstead of the federal judiciary
currently visible—an elite corps of several hundred life-tenured
generalist judges sitting, for the most part, in courts possessed of
the full range of federal jurisdiction—the federal judiciary would
encompass a broader range and variety of courts, officers, and
programs,489
which, in a way not visible to Vermeule, in the jurisdiction of “‘the last plantation,’”490
it does.
CONCLUSION:  THE GROUNDS FOR—AND TIMELINESS OF—A JURISPRUDENCE OF
ARTICLE III DUTY
The practical unlikelihood of legislative action that encroaches on nonprecedential
status rules is not the only reason why any doctrine of Article III power provides an
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495 West argues that the “current form” of what she takes to be an ethos of faith in
inadequate cure for the ethical malaise infecting the nation’s Article III appellate
courts.  Consistent with Vermeule’s argument that courts may be prone to declare
unconstitutional legislation that makes “debatable” inroads into “core [judicial and
curial] functions,”491 the emergent pro-subordination bias diagnosable in the leading
inherent judicial power and nondelegation doctrine cases suggests that they are likely
to do so in the event of a legislative challenge to the constitutional legitimacy of non-
precedential status rules, where the net effect of such legislation is not to spare them
the ennui of adjudicating matters they consider unworthy of their time, energy, and
expertise, but rather the reverse.
The likelihood of such a legislative challenge is low, given that federal rules are
characteristically made by a formally legislative process that is in fact driven by the
courts themselves.  This likelihood is decreased by the fact that, as to the constitu-
tionally suspect practices that nonprecedential status rules justify and enable, problems
of standing and evidence render the appellate courts practically immune from any
disruptions of business as usual beyond any embarrassment caused by imprudent ad-
missions about what the reasons for the rules really are, and the shoddy adjudicatory
practices that underpin them.492  Borrowing from Robin West’s indictment of Melville’s
Captain Vere, nonprecedential status rules and the practices they authorize and enable
constitute a betrayal of judicial office, and of the law’s fabric and logic, as well as
its texts, “for the most personal and perverted reasons.”493
In such a context, no doctrine of Article III power is adequate to address this
pervasive institutional failure of judicial ethics.  What is called for is a doctrine of
Article III duty, a refocusing of the gaze of the Article III appellate judge away from
personal or institutional power, interests, and convenience, and towards those on whom
he passes judgment, to rule of law and constitutionalist values, and to the constitu-
tional logic of existing Article III jurisprudence.
Constitutional challenges turning on judicial power and the doctrine of precedent
have a history of association with perceived crises in relations between state and sub-
ject.  These include the reflections of natural law theory494 in the early cases on prece-
dent as the failsafe protector of private property rights.  We find them too in responses
of the Article III judiciary to the nation’s constitutive inequality, the law as an agent
of structural subordination, as in the origins of nonprecedential status rules in the
Fourth Circuit’s reaction to Brown,495 and Justice Thomas’s meditations on the
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asserted limits of the equitable injunction in modern desegregation jurisprudence.496
Thus a doctrine of Article III duty includes an articulation of responsibility for pro-
tecting individuals against unconstitutional exercises of government power, and the
development of a judicial culture of genuine restraint, directed to checking the im-
proper use of judicial power against have-not litigants, rather than against the charge
of judicial overreaching in the conventional context of disputes over separation of
powers indefeasibly vested in the judicial branch.
The most interesting and productive aspect of Vermeule’s proposal is the pos-
sibility that the discursive force of doctrine may operate to shift what he labels the
cognitive bias that leads judges to overprotect judicial prerogatives in separation of
powers cases, grounded in part in “habituation,” skewing of knowledge towards what
is most familiar, that is, judicial prerogative.497  In the light of my conclusions in
Part III, any heuristic available to shift settled patterns of thought and vision, circum-
scribed by unreflective self-interest and clothed in the rhetoric of necessity, is of use
in generating a thick Article III duty doctrine and in having it affect the material
practices of Article III judging both in and beyond the context of direct separation
of powers challenges.
For Article III courts to realize the promise aggrieved citizens continue to per-
ceive in the promise of Brown, rather than to confirm their abiding agency in main-
taining the nation’s constitutive inequality, might be thought enough to counsel that
a doctrine of Article III duty is overdue.  A contemporary constitutional crisis in which
questions both of state power and of inequality are imbricated suggests that the need
for such a doctrine and the changed rules and practices it would mandate is presently
especially acute.  While the enemy combatant cases, from Rasul v. Bush498 and Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld499 to Boumediene v. Bush,500 have all addressed questions of the jurisdiction
of Article III courts in the context of alleged overreaching of state power into the civil
liberties of persons whom majoritarian democracy imperfectly protects, it could be
argued that a thick doctrine of Article III power, or duty, is redundant when the nation
has a written and entrenched Bill of Rights.  Who needs a thick doctrine of Article III
power when you have the Suspension Clause?  This would be to fail to register that
the kinds of issues that have emerged in this group of Article III power cases, includ-
ing the procedural protections afforded by statute or common law to noncitizens, those
detained outside the U.S., and those who are not seamlessly accommodated by con-
ventional law of war doctrine, and the question of what is constitutionally due to
such persons, do not neatly fit within the imagined four corners of the Constitution.
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While a detailed consideration of the contours of the doctrine of Article III
power emergent in the enemy combatant cases is beyond the scope of this Article,
there are signs in Boumediene’s robust invocation of the language of the separation
of powers as well as its articulation of the scope of the Suspension Clause, that the
Court itself increasingly understands the role of the Article III courts to be informed
by constitutionalist logic.  There is likewise some recent evidence suggesting that
the lower federal courts at the business end of Guantánamo proceedings are also de-
veloping such a consciousness.  Take, for example, the recent response by Chief
Judge Lamberth of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to the Attorney
General’s suggestion that the legislature should design the procedures to be applied
in his court’s hearing of the habeas actions brought by Guantánamo detainees in the
wake of Boumediene.501
Arguably less amenable to resolution by recourse to the Suspension Clause was the
case of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a legal resident alien arrested on U.S. soil, detained
in military custody for five years without trial, without seeing his wife and children,
and allegedly tortured.502  A sharply split Fourth Circuit held that indefinite detention
of an enemy combatant in these circumstances had been authorized by Congress and
was lawful, but that al-Marri “ha[d] not been afforded sufficient process to challenge
his designation as an enemy combatant.”503
The Bush government’s position in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli was that the “President
has both statutory and inherent constitutional authority” to detain suspected terrorists
without criminal trial, and that indefinite detention of citizens is likewise permissible;
the majority of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.504  Despite the Obama
government’s decision to criminally prosecute al-Marri, and the Supreme Court’s
vacating of the decision, the nation’s federal courts still face considerable challenges
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in fashioning Article III doctrine responsive to impending constitutional crises.  The
scope of such challenges is indicated by recent suggestions, given the likely closing
of the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, and the likelihood that many among the
remaining detainees are neither repatriable nor likely to be tried in U.S. courts, that
“preventive detention” on U.S. soil is an acceptable response to the problem of sus-
pected terrorists detained by the U.S. in circumstances where they are not amenable
to criminal trial because of problems of proof, and of “classified” evidence, nor yet
squarely covered by the law of war.505  Such might also be said of the various chal-
lenges to conventional constitutional criminal procedural norms that “War on Terror”
cases have brought to the lower federal courts:  these include the taking of secret
evidence and the issuing of secret opinions,506 and the question of whether hearsay
evidence is adequate to authorize indefinite detention.507
Boumediene and al-Marri make it plain that a Bill of Rights is nothing without
the judicial subjects who give it meaning, particularly in an historical context where
an expansionist doctrine of state power over “outsider” individuals, and a willingness
to create jurisdictions of exception to give that doctrine meaning, hold sway in the
Executive and Legislative branches, as has recently been the case.
The history of Article III power which this Article records begins and ends,
then, in the Fourth Circuit, and with the ancient prerogative writ of habeas corpus.
As al-Marri compellingly demonstrates, what those who hold Article III office make
of the current passage of history is of relevance to us all.  The abiding quotidian
national history documented in this Article, less dramatic than the annals of the “War
on Terror,” might lead us to conclude that its relevance is pressing, and that the insti-
tutional culture of the courts of appeals means that many who hold Article III office
are ill equipped to discharge their responsibility to constitutionalism.  The grim history
of the development of nonprecedential status rules suggests that for aliens and others,
replacing constitutional solipsism with constitutional duty is long overdue.
